Reasons, justification, and defeat / edited by Jessica Brown, Mona Simion.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Simion, Mona, editor.

Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne), editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Reasoning.

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (vii, 289 pages) : illustrations.

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

New York, New York : Oxford University Press, [2021]

Summary:

'Reasons, Justification, and Defeat' is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.

Contents:

Intro

Cover

Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

Copyright

Contents

List of Contributors

1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

1.2. The Nature and Extent of Defeat

1.2.1 Defeaters as Reasons

1.2.2 Defeaters as Reliable Processes

1.2.3 Defeat Scepticism

1.2.4 Higher-Order Defeat

1.3. Kinds of Defeaters

1.3.1 By Mechanism

1.3.2 By Normative Status

1.3.3 By Psychological Status

1.4. Summary of the Volume

References

2: The Normativity of Knowledge and the Scope and Sources of Defeat

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

2.6.

3: The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

3.5.

4: Losing Knowledge by Thinking about Thinking

4.1. Justification and the Basis of a Judgment

4.2. The Function of Subjective Representations of Basis

4.3. Defeat Cases, and Shifts of Basis

5: Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat

5.1. Success and Good Dispositions

5.2. Ways and Dispositions

5.3. Dispositional Evaluations

5.4. Putative Defeat and Dispositional Discrimination

5.5. A Better Feasible Disposition

5.6. Contrast with Instrumentalist Views

5.7. Conclusions

6: Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Extremism, Moderation, and a New Third Way

6.2.1 Extremism and Moderation

6.2.2 Making Room for Moderation

6.3. Higher-Order Evidence and Reasons to Suspend

6.3.1 When the Evidence Gives Out

6.3.2 The Nature of Suspension and What it Tells us about the Rational Profile of Suspension

6.4. A Wondrous Resolution

6.5. The Substantive Options for a Finer Resolution

6.6. Conclusion

7: Reasons for Reliabilism

7.1. Two Approaches to Justification.

7.2. The Classic Reliabilist Account of Defeat

7.2.1 Why Reliabilists Need an Account of Defeat

7.2.2 The ARP Account of Defeat

7.3. Difficulties for the Classic Reliabilist Account

7.3.1 Defeater Defeaters

7.3.2 Hidden Circularity

7.3.3 Alternative Processes that One Should Not Use

7.3.4 Looking Forward

7.4. Pollock's Reasons First Framework

7.5. Reason to Want More

7.6. Reasons Reliabilism

7.6.1 A Reliabilist Account of Reasons

7.6.2 From Reasons to Justification

7.7. Problems Solved

7.7.1 A More Satisfactory Reasons-Based Framework

7.7.2 A More Satisfactory Treatment of Defeat

7.7.2.1 Defeater Defeat

7.7.2.2 Circularity Worries

7.7.2.3 Alternative Processes that One Should Not Use

Thinking About Unger, ARP predicts that Harry's belief in .... is defeated merely in virtue of

7.7.3 Capturing the Role of Reasons in Justification

7.8. Comparison with Evidentialist Hybrids

7.8.1 The Two-Component View

7.8.2 First Advantage: Reductive and Predictive

7.8.3 Second Advantage: No Immunity to Defeat

7.8.4 Taking Stock

7.9. Conclusion

8: Knowledge, Action, and Defeasibility

8.1. Introduction

8.2. Towards a Knowledge-Centered Psychology

8.3. Intentional Action does Require Knowledge

8.4. From a Knowledge-Centered Psychology to Intellectualism About Know-How

8.5. The Defeasibility of Know-How

8.6. Conclusions

9: Undercutting Defeat: When it Happens and Some Implications for Epistemology

9.1. Pollock on Defeaters

9.2. Sturgeon against Pollock

9.3. In Defense of Pollockian Undercutting Defeat (in the Inferential Case)

9.4. Undercutting Defeat for Noninferential Justification?

9.5. A Tool for Distinguishing Inferential from Non-inferential Justification

9.6. Conclusion

10: Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance

10.1. Introduction.

10.2. Defeaters as De-Confirmers

10.2.1 Back to the List

10.3. Rationality, Defeat, and Epistemic Norms

10.4. Defeat as an Indication of Ignorance

10.5. Conclusion

Appendix

11: Competing Reasons

11.1. Competition Between Reasons

11.2. Balance Accounts

11.3. Reasons For and Reasons Against

11.4. Criticism-Based Accounts

10.5. Toward a Positive Account

12: Perceptual Reasons and Defeat

12.1. Background: Reasons and Evidence

12.2. Perceptual Knowledge and Defeat

12.2.1 The Classical Theory-What

12.2.2 Consequences of the Classical Theory

12.3. Doubly World-Implicating Views

12.3.1 Consequences of Doubly World-Implicating Views

12.4. Singly World-Implicating Views

12.4.2 Comparing Singly World-Implicating Views

12.5. Summing-Up

Index.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2021.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-258649-1

0-19-188211-9

0-19-258648-3

OCLC:

1245671247