Epistemic explanations : a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains / Ernest Sosa.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sosa, Ernest, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Normativity (Ethics).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 234 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Theory of telic normativity, and what it explains

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2021]

Summary:

'Epistemic Explanations' develops an improved virtue epistemology and uses it to explain several epistemic phenomena. Part I lays out a telic virtue epistemology that accommodates varieties of knowledge and understanding particularly pertinent to the humanities. Part II develops an epistemology of suspension of judgment, by relating it to degrees of confidence and to inquiry. Part III develops a substantially improved telic virtue epistemology by appeal to default assumptions important in domains of human performance generally, and in our intellectual lives as a special case.

Contents:

Cover

Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains

Copyright

Acknowledgments

Contents

Preface

Part I: Insight and Understanding, and two sides of Epistemology

1: Insight and Understanding

2: Gnoseology and Intellectual Ethics

A. A Virtue Epistemology

B. Attempts and Aimings

C. Judgments

D. Representations

E. Conscious Judgments

F. The Swamping Problem for Reliabilism

G. Two Sides of Epistemology: Gnoseology and Intellectual Ethics

H. Appendix on Telic Normativity

Part II: The Nature and Varieties of Suspension

3: The Place of Suspension and Problems for Evidentialism

A. The Place and Importance of Suspension

B. Suspension and Evidentialism

Evidentialism

C. The Bearing of Telic Normativity

D. Suspension and Epistemic Normativity

E. Skepticism

Appendix

4: Suspension, Confidence, and Inquiry

A. Suspension of Judgment: What It Is and Some Varieties

B. The Place of Confidence in Gnoseology (in the Theory of Knowledge)

C. Means-End Reasoning and Means-End Action

D. Action and Forbearance in Epistemology: Judgment, Inquiry, and Suspension

5: When and How Is Suspension Apt?

A. What Makes Suspending Epistemically Appropriate?

B. The Importance of Proper Inquiry and Omission of Further Inquiry

6: More on Suspension: Its Varieties and How It Relates to Being in a Position to Know

Part III: The Telic Nature of Knowledge, and some Main Varieties

7: Knowledge, Default, and Skepticism

A. What Lies Ahead

B. What Is a Background Condition?

C. Radical Skepticism and Relevant Alternatives

D. Adversity Ahead

E. The Place of Default Reconsidered

F. Knowledge and Default

G. Default Assumptions Again

H. Deductive Closure

I. Are We Not Confusing the Epistemic with the Practical?.

J. An Application: Barn-spotting

K. Concluding Remarks

8: Grades of Knowledge

A. A Simple View Sketched

B. Knowledge and Competence, Global versus Local

C. Grades of Knowledge

9: Reflection and Security

A. Default Assumptions

B. Two Sorts of Performance Domains: the Ludic versus the Practical and Non-Ludic

D. Security Explained

E. A Closer Look

F. What Unifies the Hierarchy?

10: Competence and Justification

A. Competence, Safety, and Reliability

B. Epistemic Competence

C. How Is a Skill Manifest in a Skillful Performance?

D. Do We Really Disagree?

E. Epistemic Justification and Agential Competence

Part IV: A Historical Antecedent

11: The Relevance of Moore and Wittgenstein

A. Moore and Common Sense

B. Wittgenstein's On Certainty

C. What Alternative Might Be Available?

D. Exploring an Alternative

E. A Better Alternative

F. Why We Need to Go beyond both Moore and Wittgenstein

Appendix: Moore and Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Common Sense

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2021.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-259845-7

0-19-188973-3

0-19-259844-9

OCLC:

1260345723