1 option
Normativity, rationality, and reasoning : selected essays / John Broome.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Broome, John, 1947- author.
- Series:
- Oxford scholarship online.
- Oxford scholarship online
- Standardized Title:
- Works. Selections
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Reasoning--Ability testing.
- Reasoning.
- Normativity (Ethics).
- Practical reason.
- Genre:
- Informational works.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (203 pages)
- Edition:
- First edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, [2021]
- Summary:
- This volume presents a selection of John Broome's most important work since 2000 in an area of philosophy where he has led the way. Topics discussed include the structure of normativity; the priority of oughts over reasons; the distinction between rationality and normativity; the character of human reasoning; and the nature of preferences.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Normativity,Rationality and Reasoning: Selected Essays
- Copyright
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part A
- Part B
- Part C
- PART A: NORMATIVITY
- 1: Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The reasoned property and the oughted property
- 3. The reasoned-for relation and the oughted-for relation
- 4. Type relations
- 5. Reducing the properties to the relations
- 6. The property of being a reason reduced to the reasoned-for relation
- 7. Apparent disagreements
- 8. The property of being a reason reduced to the oughted-for relation
- 9. Ought fundamentalism and reason fundamentalism
- 10. The unfaithfulness of reason fundamentalism
- 11. Conclusion in favour of ought fundamentalism
- Note added in 2021
- Acknowledgements
- 2: Giving reasons and given reasons
- 1. Introduction: giving reasons and given reasons
- 2. Favouring and owning
- 3. Reasons primitivism
- 4. What is a given reason?
- 5. Reasons primitivism again
- 6. Conclusion
- 3: The first normative 'reason'
- Note
- 4: A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?
- 2. The place of 'ought' in linguistics
- 3. The standard semantic theory
- 4. The deontic and the normative
- 5. Specialized vocabulary
- 6. The central ought of normativity
- 7. Enkrasia
- 8. A problem with deontic logic
- 9. An alternative semantics
- 5: Williams on ought
- 2. Logical structure
- 3. Indexed oughts
- 4. Indexation by motivation
- 5. Ownership
- 6. Williams's arguments
- 7. A counterexample
- 8. Did OMO recognize ownership?
- 9. Conclusion
- PART B: RATIONALITY
- 6: Rationality versus normativity
- 2. The meaning of 'normative'
- 3. Meanings of 'reason'
- 4. The meaning of 'rational'.
- Substantive rationality
- Reified rationality
- 5. Reduction, entailment, and identity of requirements
- 6. Normative compliance does not supervene on the mind
- Does whether or not you ought to F supervene on your mind?
- Your Fing does not supervene on your mind whenever you ought to F
- 7. Rationality supervenes on the mind
- 8. Conclusion
- 7: Motivation
- 1. The Possibility of Altruism
- 2. Some explanatory schemes
- 3. Opposing motivations
- 4. Autonomous normativity
- 5. Acting for a reason
- 6. Intentions
- 7. Instrumental rationality and reasoning
- 8. Enkrasia and reasoning
- PART C: REASONING
- 8: Normativity in reasoning
- 1. Reasoning
- 2. Higher-order accounts of reasoning
- 3. A first-order account of reasoning
- 4. Following a rule
- 5. Normative guidance
- 6. Normative guidance in following a rule of reasoning
- 7. Intentional guidance
- 8. Habitual guidance
- 9. Intentional guidance in following a rule of reasoning
- 10. Conclusion
- 9: A linking belief is not essential for reasoning
- 2. A first-order linking belief: the taking condition
- 3. What reasoning is
- 4. An implicit linking belief
- 5. Intention reasoning
- 6. An implicit first-order linking belief?
- 7. An implicit second-order linking belief?
- 10: Reasoning with preferences?
- 1. Reasoning and requirements of rationality
- 2. Second-order theoretical reasoning
- 3. First-order theoretical reasoning
- 4. Concepts of preference
- 5. Second-order reasoning for broad preferences
- 6. First-order reasoning with ordinary preferences
- 7. Preferences and beliefs about betterness
- References
- Index.
- Notes:
- This edition also issued in print: 2021.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- ISBN:
- 0-19-255830-7
- 0-19-193766-5
- 0-19-255829-3
- OCLC:
- 1265460464
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.