Making AI intelligible : philosophical foundations / Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cappelen, Herman, author.

Dever, Josh, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Artificial intelligence--Philosophy.

Artificial intelligence.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (192 pages).

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Making artificial intelligence intelligible

Philosophical foundations

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Can humans and artificial intelligences share concepts and communicate? This book shows that philosophical work on the metaphysics of meaning can help answer these questions. Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever use the externalist tradition in philosophy to create models of how AIs and humans can understand each other. In doing so, they illustrate ways in which that philosophical tradition can be improved. The questions addressed in the book are not only theoretically interesting, but the answers have pressing practical implications.

Contents:

Cover

Making AI Intelligible Philosophical Foundations: Philosophical Foundations

Copyright

Contents

Part I: Introduction and Overview

Chapter 2: Alfred (the Dismissive Sceptic): Philosophers, Go Away!

A Dialogue with Alfred (the Dismissive Sceptic)

Part II: A Proposal for how to Attribute Content to AI

Chapter 3: Terminology: Aboutness, Representation, and Metasemantics

Loose Talk, Hyperbole, or 'Derived Intentionality'?

Aboutness and Representation

AI, Metasemantics, and the Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 4: Our Theory: De-Anthropocentrized Externalism

First Claim: Content for AI Systems Should Be Explained Externalistically

Second Claim: Existing Externalist Accounts of Content Are Anthropocentric

Third Claim: We Need Meta-Metasemantic Guidance

A Meta-Metasemantic Suggestion: Interpreter-centric Knowledge-Maximization

Chapter 5: Application: The Predicate 'High Risk'

The Background Theory: Kripke-Style Externalism

Starting Thought: SmartCredit Expresses High Risk Contents Because of its Causal History

Anthropocentric Abstraction of 'Anchoring'

Schematic AI-Suitable Kripke-Style Metasemantics

Complications and Choice Points

Taking Stock

Appendix to Chapter 5: More on Reference Preservation in ML Systems

Chapter 6: Application: Names and the Mental Files Framework

Does SmartCredit Use Names?

The Mental Files Framework to the Rescue?

Epistemically Rewarding Relations for Neural Networks?

Case Studies, Complications, and Reference Shifts

Chapter 7: Application: Predication and Commitment

Predication: Brief Introduction to the Act Theoretic View

Turning to AI and Disentangling Three Different Questions

The Metasemantics of Predication: A Teleofunctionalist Hypothesis

Some Background: Teleosemantics and Teleofunctional Role.

Predication in AI

AI Predication and Kinds of Teleology

Why Teleofunctionalism and Not Kripke or Evans?

Teleofunctional Role and Commitment (or Assertion)

Theories of Assertion and Commitment for Humans and AI

Part III: Conclusion

Chapter 8: Four Concluding Thoughts

Dynamic Goals

A Story of Neural Networks Taking Over in Ways We Cannot Understand

Why This Story is Disturbing and Relevant

Taking Stock and General Lessons

The Extended Mind and AI Concept Possession

Background: The Extended Mind and Active Externalism

The Extended Mind and Conceptual Competency

From Experts Determining Meaning to Artificial Intelligences Determining Meaning

Some New Distinctions: Extended Mind Internalist versus Extended Mind Externalists

Kripke, Putnam, and Burge as Extended Mind Internalists

Concept Possession, Functionalism, and Ways of Life

Implications for the View Defended in This Book

An Objection Revisited

Reply to the Objection

What Makes it a Stop Sign Detector?

Adversarial Perturbations

Explainable AI and Metasemantics

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2021.

"This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution - Non Commercial - No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)"--Home page.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on April 22, 2021).

ISBN:

0-19-264756-3

0-19-191560-2

0-19-264755-5

OCLC:

1249471030