The external tax strategy of the EU in a post-BEPS environment / editor, Adolfo Martín Jiménez.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Jiménez, Adolfo J. Martin, editor.

Series:

GREIT Series

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

International business enterprises--Taxation--Law and legislation.

International business enterprises.

Taxation--Law and legislation--European Union countries.

Taxation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (417 pages) : illustrations

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam, The Netherlands : IBFD, 2019.

Summary:

The book examines the configuration of the EUs external tax policy, commenting on where it should be reconsidered and on specific situations of select trading partners.

Contents:

Cover

Title

Copyright

Preface

Part 1: The EU External Tax Policy in a Strict Sense

Chapter 1: The EU's External Strategy for Effective Taxation: The General Framework and the Role Played by the European Commission

1.1. The EU external policy before 2016

1.2. Principles of good governance in tax matters

1.2.1. From "good governance" to "tax good governance"

1.2.2. The EU recipe on tax good governance

1.3. The external strategy on taxation: The scope

1.3.1. Introduction

1.3.2. A new listing process

1.3.3. A new tax good governance clause

1.3.4. The implementation of good governance principles in bilateral and multilateral instruments

1.4. The EU list of non-cooperative third-country jurisdictions for tax purposes

1.4.1. The EU listing process

1.4.2. Implementation of the EU list

1.5. Conclusions

Chapter 2: The Compatibility of the EU Tax Haven "Blacklist" with the Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter

2.1. Introduction

2.2. List of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes

2.2.1. The Blacklist as part of the EU external strategy in tax matters

2.2.2. Grounds to be put on the Blacklist

2.2.3. Defensive measures

2.2.4. Domestic and EU-wide blacklists

2.3. Compatibility of the Blacklist with the free movement of capital

2.3.1. Scope

2.3.2. Restriction

2.3.3. Justification

2.3.4. Proportionality

2.4. Compatibility with the Charter

2.4.1. Scope

2.4.2. Human rights compatibility with blacklisting

2.5. Conclusion

Chapter 3: Trade Agreements and the External Tax Policy of the European Union: Is a Change in Direction Needed, and Are EU Tax Treaties an Alternative?

3.1. Introduction

3.2. The role of agreements with third countries in the EU external tax policy.

3.2.1. The first phase in the policy formulation: Connection between trade and taxation

3.2.2. The second phase: The 2016 Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation

3.3. Good governance and State aid clauses in EU treaties with third countries: The current situation

3.4. Tax good governance and State aid clauses in EU treaties with third countries: An assessment

3.5. Direct taxes and trade agreements between the European Union and third countries

3.6. Is it a good policy to give more tax content to EU trade agreements, or should tax issues be detached from trade agreements?

3.7. Conclusions

Part 2: The External EU Tax Policy in a Broad Sense

Chapter 4: The EU and OECD Contend to Lead Global Tax Governance

4.1. Introduction

4.2. The importance of international tax good governance

4.3. 20 years in perspective

4.3.1. Origins

4.3.2. The expansion of the good governance concept to taxation

4.3.3. Efforts to institutionalize international tax good governance

4.3.4. Globalization of tax good governance

4.4. Current situation

4.4.1. Membership

4.4.2. Focus

4.4.3. Instruments

4.5. Looking at the future

4.5.1. The case for global tax good governance

4.5.2. Competition between the OECD and the European Union

4.6. Conclusion

Chapter 5: Transparency and Exchange of Information: BEPS in EU Legislation - More Advanced Standards or Distortion?

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Transparency in the European Union

5.3. More advanced standards or distortion?

Chapter 6: Regulation and Effects of Fiscal State Aid in Third-State Relations

6.1. Overview

6.2. State aid is catching up

6.3. The triple face of the arm's length principle

6.4. (The US reaction to) the Apple case

6.4.1. Five ways to present the Apple case

6.4.2. The impact on transatlantic relations.

6.5. Discrimination analysis or benchmark approach?

6.6. State aid provisions in agreements with third states

6.6.1. Introduction: State aid law is typically EU (and EEA) and viewed as rather odd in many third states

6.6.2. The EEA Agreement

6.6.3. The EU-Switzerland Trade Agreement

6.6.4. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)

6.6.5. EU-Canada: Chapter 7 of the CETA

6.6.6. The EU-MED agreements

6.6.7. EU-South Africa/SADC Agreement

6.7. Conclusion

Chapter 7: The BEPS Multilateral Instrument and EU Law

7.1. Introduction

7.2. Object, purpose and structural features of the BEPS MLI

7.3. The relations between the BEPS MLI and EU law

7.4. The implementation of the BEPS MLI and EU law

7.4.1. The legal instruments for implementation in the European Union

7.4.2. The notion of abusive practices under the BEPS MLI and EU secondary and primary law

7.4.3. Arbitrating cross-border tax disputes in the European Union

7.5. Conclusions

Chapter 8: The ATAD and Third Countries

8.1. Introduction

8.2. The policy perspective

8.2.1. In general

8.2.2. The ATAD as the European Union's response to the BEPS Project

8.2.3. The exit tax regime

8.2.3.1. The ATAD preamble

8.2.3.2. Taxation of outbound transfers and option for deferral

8.2.3.3. Inbound transfers

8.2.3.4. Critical remarks

8.2.4. The CFC rule

8.2.4.1. Conditions for application and effects

8.2.4.2. Critical remarks

8.3. The ATAD and tax treaties with third countries

8.3.1. Possible conflicts between the ATAD and tax treaties between Member States and third countries

8.3.2. The ATAD CFC rule and previous tax treaties

8.3.3. ATAD hybrid mismatch rules and previous tax treaties

8.3.3.1. In general

8.3.3.2. Disregarded permanent establishments

8.3.3.3. Hybrid payments.

8.4. The ATAD and the free movement of capital

8.5. Conclusions

Chapter 9: Coordination of Negotiation of Member States' Double Tax Treaties with Third States in a Post-BEPS and Post-ATAD Era: The Case of Hybrid Mismatches

9.1. About coordination of Member States' negotiation of double tax treaties with third states

9.1.1. A matter of competence?

9.1.2. Assumptions and questions

9.2. Hybrid mismatches and third states

9.2.1. Typology

9.2.2. Examples

9.2.2.1. Questions

9.2.2.2. Hybrid Instruments, different characterization of income and deduction/non-inclusion

9.2.2.3. Branch mismatches

9.2.2.4. Dual-residence mismatches (article 9b of the ATAD)

9.2.2.5. Interim conclusions

9.3. Conclusions

Part 3: The European Union as a Block for Third Countries and Cases of EU Relations with Individual States

Chapter 10: Harmful Tax Competition from the European Union towards Third Countries?

10.1. Introduction

10.2. Harmful tax competition

10.2.1. Harmful tax competition

10.2.1.1. Theories of harmful tax competition

10.2.1.2. OECD and EU definitions of harmful tax competition

10.2.2. Good tax competition?

10.2.3. Harmful tax competition: More complicated than it first appears

10.3. Tax competition of the European Union: Examples from primary EU law

10.3.1. Introduction

10.3.2. Fundamental freedoms

10.3.3. State aid

10.4. Tax competition by the European Union: Examples from secondary EU law

10.4.1. VAT

10.4.2. Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest and Royalties Directive

10.4.3. Common consolidated corporate tax base

10.4.4. An example of defensive tax measures: The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive

10.4.5. The proposals for special taxation of digital services

10.5. Tax competition by the European Union: Impact of soft law

10.6. Conclusion and outlook.

Chapter 11: Challenges for a Europeanist in Times of BEPS and the ATAD

11.1. Introduction

11.2. Challenges for the internal market

11.2.1. The long and unfulfilled wish list

11.2.2. Cross-border tax loss relief

11.2.3. Common consolidated corporate tax base

11.2.4. Tackling double taxation

11.2.5. Closing loopholes and gaps in existing directives that still allow double taxation

11.2.6. Abandoning an EU system of exchange of information

11.2.7. The challenge of finding EU tax incentives compatible with State aid rules

11.2.8. Conclusion on the challenges for the internal market

11.3. Challenges for the euro

11.3.1. The nature of the difference in challenge

11.3.2. The weaknesses in the current institutional set-up of the euro

11.3.3. Inadequate size of the ESM

11.3.4. Deficiencies in the decision-making procedure

11.3.5. Absence of a common economic policy

11.3.6. Absence of a separate and independent budget

11.4. Remedies improving the current institutional set-up

11.4.1. The list of reforms

11.4.2. Replacing the ESM with an EUMF

11.4.3. Completion of the banking union

11.4.4. Reforming the ECB into a lender of last resort

11.4.5. Establishing a central authority for a eurozone economic policy

11.4.6. A separate and independent budget

11.4.7. Separate and independent financing of the euro budget through uniform euro taxes

11.5. Conclusion: A democratic revolution is needed

11.5.1. The institutional condition: No taxation without representation

11.5.2. The mind shift on the European Economic Union

11.5.3. Take it or leave it

Chapter 12: The WTO Implications of Brexit: UK Traders Caught between International and EU (Trade and Tax) Law?

12.1. Introduction

12.2. The WTO and the European Union.

12.2.1. How both regulatory systems remove (tax) obstacles to trade.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

90-8722-503-2

OCLC:

1096483312