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Empirical analyses of regulation and negotiated prices / Joao Vitor Granja de Almeida.
- Format:
- Book
- Thesis/Dissertation
- Author/Creator:
- Granja de Almeida, Joao Vitor, author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Public policy.
- Economics--Penn dissertations.
- Penn dissertations--Economics.
- Local Subjects:
- Public policy.
- Economics--Penn dissertations.
- Penn dissertations--Economics.
- Genre:
- Academic theses.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (133 pages)
- Contained In:
- Dissertations Abstracts International 82-11A.
- Place of Publication:
- [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] : University of Pennsylvania ; Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021.
- Language Note:
- English
- System Details:
- Mode of access: World Wide Web.
- text file
- Summary:
- In the first chapter of this dissertation, I study coverage requirements, a common regulation in the mobile telecommunications industry that intends to accelerate the roll-out of new mobile telecommunications technologies to disadvantaged areas. I argue that the regulation may engender entry deterrence effects that limit its efficacy and lead to technology introduction patterns that are not cost-efficient. To quantify the impact of coverage requirements on market structure and the speed and cost of technology roll-out, I develop and estimate a dynamic game of entry and technology upgrade under regulation. I estimate the model using panel data on mobile technology availability at the municipality level in Brazil. In counterfactual simulations, I find that coverage requirements accelerate the introduction of 3G technology by just over one year, on average, and reduce firms' profits by 24% relative to a scenario with no regulation. I find the entry deterrence effects to be small. Moreover, an alternative subsidization policy leads to a similar acceleration in the roll-out of 3G and substantially higher aggregate profits, likely increasing aggregate welfare relative to coverage requirements. In the second chapter, I investigate how the portfolio of products carried by retailers influences wholesale and retail prices. To this end, I develop and estimate a model of retailer pricing and retailer-manufacturer negotiations over wholesale prices. The estimation approach extends existing econometric tools for multi-product bargaining models to a setting with optimal downstream pricing. I use the estimated model to simulate the effects of counterfactual scenarios in which private label products or the products of a national manufacturer are excluded from retailers' product portfolios. I find that wholesale prices do increase, but those effects are small. Eliminating private label products leads to an average increase in wholesale prices of only 0.10%; retail prices increase by only 0.04%. Eliminating a national manufacturer's products leads to increases in wholesale prices between 0.003% and 0.677%; retail prices decrease by 0.027%-4.210% due to downstream pricing incentives.
- Notes:
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-11, Section: A.
- Advisors: Nevo, Aviv; Committee members: Katja Seim; Jose Abito.
- Department: Economics.
- Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania 2021.
- Local Notes:
- School code: 0175
- ISBN:
- 9798738618628
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
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