Redesigning democracy : more ideas for better rules / Hans Gersbach.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gersbach, Hans, author.

Contributor:

ProQuest ebook central.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Democracy--Mathematical models.

Democracy.

Elections.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

polychrome

Place of Publication:

Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2017]

[Place of publication not identified] : [publisher not identified], [2017]

System Details:

text file

Contents:

Preface; Contents; Part I Contractual Democracy; 1 Introduction to Part I; 1.1 A Metaphor?; 1.2 Political Contract: Definition; 1.3 Does Any Campaign Promise Qualify as Contract Matter?; 1.4 Punishment and Rewards; 1.5 Renegotiation

Negative Effects; 1.6 Retrospect and New Developments; 1.7 Background; References; 2 Retrospect

Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts; 2.1 Background; 2.2 Introduction; 2.3 Model and Assumptions; 2.4 Elections; 2.5 Competition for the Incentive Contracts; 2.6 Competition Without Commitment; 2.7 Asymmetric Information

2.8 Discussion and ConclusionReferences; 3 Vote-share Contracts Without Signaling of Competence; 3.1 Background; 3.2 Introduction; 3.3 The Model; 3.3.1 Agents; 3.3.2 Policies; 3.3.3 Utilities; 3.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 3.3.5 The Overall Game; 3.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 3.4 Elections Alone; 3.4.1 The Second Period; 3.4.2 The First Period; 3.5 Vote-share Contracts; 3.5.1 Vote-shares as Political Contracts; 3.5.2 The Second and First Period; 3.5.3 Competition for Vote-share Contracts and Welfare; 3.6 Extensions and Ramifications; 3.6.1 Incumbency Advantages

3.6.2 Ramifications and Applications3.7 Conclusion; References; 4 Vote Thresholds With Signaling of Competence; 4.1 Background; 4.2 Introduction; 4.3 The Model; 4.3.1 Agents; 4.3.2 Policies; 4.3.3 Utilities; 4.3.4 Parameter Assumptions; 4.3.5 The Overall Game; 4.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept; 4.4 Elections Alone; 4.4.1 The Second Period; 4.4.2 The First Period; 4.5 Vote-share Thresholds; 4.5.1 The First Period; 4.5.2 Welfare Properties; 4.5.3 Welfare Impact of Higher Vote Thresholds; 4.5.4 Competition for Vote Thresholds; 4.6 Extensions, Applications and Generalizations

4.6.1 Further Incumbency Advantages4.6.2 Learning by Doing; 4.6.3 Alternative Election Procedures; 4.6.4 Repeated Competition With Vote Thresholds; 4.6.5 Generalizations of the Model; 4.7 Conclusion; References; 5 Information Markets, Elections and Threshold Contracts; 5.1 Background; 5.2 Introduction; 5.3 The Basic Model; 5.3.1 The Election Framework; 5.3.2 The Information Structure; 5.3.3 Reelection Schemes; 5.3.4 Preferences of Politicians; 5.3.5 Summary and Welfare Criterion; 5.4 Elections Only; 5.4.1 Behavior of Dissonant Politicians; 5.4.2 Behavior of Congruent Politicians

5.5 The Triple Mechanism5.5.1 Reelection Thresholds; 5.5.2 Reelection Schemes; 5.5.3 Summary; 5.5.4 Robust Election Scheme; 5.5.5 Equilibrium Notion; 5.5.6 Equilibria; 5.6 Extensions, Robustness and Pitfalls; 5.6.1 Monotonic Election Scheme and Overpromising; 5.6.2 Sophisticated Election Scheme; 5.6.3 Market-Based Voting; 5.6.4 Repeated Action; 5.6.5 More Candidates; 5.6.6 Manipulations; 5.7 Conclusion; References; 6 Limits of Contractual Democracy

Competition for Wages and Office; 6.1 Background; 6.2 Introduction; 6.3 The Model; 6.3.1 The Set-Up; 6.3.2 Assumptions and Economic Problem

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI Available via World Wide Web.

Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed April 12, 2017).

ISBN:

9783319534053

331953405X

Publisher Number:

99988083140

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.