Evaluating voting systems with probability models : essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley / Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin, editors.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Diss, Mostapha, editor.

Merlin, Vincent, editor.

Gehrlein, William V., honouree.

Lepelley, Dominique, honouree.

ProQuest ebook central.

Series:

Studies in choice and welfare 1614-0311

Studies in Choice and Welfare, 1614-0311

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Voting--Statistical methods.

Voting.

Decision making.

Statistics.

Genre:

Festschriften.

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2021]

System Details:

text file

PDF

Contents:

1 Introduction Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin

Part IThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes

2 Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

3 Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules under IAC: Indifference and Abstention Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui

4 The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi

5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel

Part II Other Voting Paradoxes

6 On the Probability of the Ostrogorski's Paradox William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin

7 Violations of Reversal Symmetry under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules. Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih

Part III Binary Voting in Federations

8 Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean Louis Rouet, and Laurent Vidu

9 "One Man, One Vote" Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik versus May Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, and Issofa Moyouwou

Part IV Resistance to Manipulations

10 Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules: A Comparison of Standard and Favardin-Lepelley types of Individual Manipulations Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov, and Vyacheslav Yakuba

11 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel

12 Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou

Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results Fabrice Barthelemy and Mathieu Martin

14 Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis in Large Elections Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez

Part VI Techniques for Probability Computations

15 Combinatorics of Voting Rules under Anonymity and Neutrality Alexander Karpov

16 From Gehrlein-Fishburn Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of the Ehrhart Extended Conjecture Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou

17 IAC-Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.

Notes:

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI Available via World Wide Web.

Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 04, 2021).

ISBN:

9783030485986

3030485986

Publisher Number:

99987720756

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.