Evaluating voting systems with probability models : essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley / Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin, editors.

Format:

• Book

Contributor:

• Diss, Mostapha, editor.
• Merlin, Vincent, editor.
• Gehrlein, William V., honouree.
• Lepelley, Dominique, honouree.
• ProQuest ebook central.

Series:

• Studies in choice and welfare 1614-0311
• Studies in Choice and Welfare, 1614-0311

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

• Voting--Statistical methods.
• Decision making.
• Voting.
• Statistics.

Genre:

• Festschriften.

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2021]

System Details:

• text file
• PDF

Contents:

• 1 Introduction Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin
• Part IThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes
• 2 Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
• 3 Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules under IAC: Indifference and Abstention Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui
• 4 The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi
• 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel
• Part II Other Voting Paradoxes
• 6 On the Probability of the Ostrogorski's Paradox William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin
• 7 Violations of Reversal Symmetry under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules. Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih
• Part III Binary Voting in Federations
• 8 Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean Louis Rouet, and Laurent Vidu
• 9 "One Man, One Vote" Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik versus May Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, and Issofa Moyouwou
• Part IV Resistance to Manipulations
• 10 Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules: A Comparison of Standard and Favardin-Lepelley types of Individual Manipulations Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov, and Vyacheslav Yakuba
• 11 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel
• 12 Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou
• Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results Fabrice Barthelemy and Mathieu Martin
• 14 Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis in Large Elections Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez
• Part VI Techniques for Probability Computations
• 15 Combinatorics of Voting Rules under Anonymity and Neutrality Alexander Karpov
• 16 From Gehrlein-Fishburn Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of the Ehrhart Extended Conjecture Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou
• 17 IAC-Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.

Notes:

• Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI Available via World Wide Web.
• Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 04, 2021).

ISBN:

• 9783030485986
• 3030485986

Publisher Number:

99987720756

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.