Inquiry, knowledge, and understanding / Christoph Kelp.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kelp, Christoph, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Inquiry (Theory of knowledge).

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (viii, 212 pages).

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2021]

Summary:

This study takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them.

Contents:

Cover

Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding

Copyright

Dedication

Preface

Contents

Introduction: Inquiry and Epistemology

1: The Aim of Inquiry

1. The Aim of Inquiry into Specific Questions

1.1 The Aim of Inquiry Requires Knowledge

1.2 The Aim of Inquiry Requires Nothing More than Knowledge

2. Objections and Replies

2.1 Against the Arguments for Knowledge Aim

2.2 The Aim of Inquiry Can't Require Truth

2.3 The Aim of Inquiry Can't Be Knowledge

2.4 The Aim of Inquiry Can't Require Justification

3. Conclusion

2: Knowledge

1. A Network Analysis

1.1 Reductive and Network Analyses

1.2 Activities with Constitutive Aims and Norms

1.3 ACANs, Dismantling, and Network Analysis

1.4 Inquiry, Knowledge, and Belief

1.5 Evidence for the Network Analysis

2.1 That's Not Inquiry

2.2 Belief Doesn't Close Inquiry

2.3 Knowledge Is Not the Constitutive Aim of Inquiry

2.4 Activities Don't Have Aims

2.5 Dismantling in Ramsey-Lewis Style?

3. The Competition

3.1 Preliminaries

3.2 Causal Explanations of Action

3.3 Theoretical Virtues

4. Conclusion

3: Conditions on Knowledge

1. Knowledge and Ability

1.1 ACAN Abilities

1.2 Exercises of ACAN Abilities

1.3 Competent ACAN Moves

1.4 Substantive Conditions on Proper Question Closing

1.5 Why These Conditions?

2. Objections

2.1 Redundancy

2.2 Queerness

2.3 Back on the Road to a Dismantling Analysis

4: Understanding

1. The Aim of Inquiry into General Phenomena

1.1 Phenomena

1.2 Just More Specific Questions?

2. A Network Analysis

2.1 Inquiry, Understanding, and Views

2.2 More on Degrees and Outright Understanding

3. Objections

3.1 Gettiered Understanding

3.2 Models, Idealizations, and Thought Experiments in Science.

3.3 Scientific Progress

3.4 Understanding via Incompatible Theories

4. The Competition

4.1 Explanatory Understanding

4.2 Explanationism

5. Conclusion

5: Epistemic Value

1. A Normative Framework

1.1 Normativity in Epistemology

1.2 Critical Domains

1.3 The Epistemic Domain

2. Value Problems

2.1 Knowledge

2.2 Understanding

3.1 No Domain-Relative For-Its-Own-Sake Value

3.2 Central Values vs Fundamental Goods

3.3 A Superficial Solution?

3.4 The Epistemic Value of Justified and True Belief

6: Scepticism

1. The Argument from Ignorance

2. The Case against Transmission of Knowledge

2.1 The Argument

2.2 Diagnosis

2.3 The Case

2.4 The Validation of Transmission of Knowledge

2.5 Accommodating Transmission of Knowledge Failure

2.6 Back to AI2

3. The Case against AI1

3.1 Reasons for Resisting AI1

3.2 Theoretical Underpinnings

3.3 Diagnosis

4. Objections

4.1 Denying Bridge 1

4.2 Lost Knowledge

4.3 Question-Begging

5. The Competition

5.1 Sensitivity

5.2 Problems for Sensitivity

5.3 Can We Do Better?

6. Conclusion

APPENDIX 1

1. Commitment Release

2. Progress

APPENDIX 2

1. Virtue Epistemology

2. Back-Pedalling

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2021.

Includes bibliographical references (pages [203]-208) and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-264942-6

0-19-264941-8

0-19-191855-5

OCLC:

1243549924