Mass tort deals : backroom bargaining in multidistrict litigation / Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, University of Georgia School of Law.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Burch, Elizabeth Chamblee, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Complex litigation--United States.

Complex litigation.

Joinder of actions.

United States.

Torts--United States.

Torts.

Joinder of actions--United States.

Class actions (Civil procedure)--United States.

Class actions (Civil procedure).

Compromise (Law)--United States.

Compromise (Law).

Due process of law--United States.

Due process of law.

Physical Description:

xiv, 277 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Summary:

"Mass Tort Deals marshals a wide array of empirical data on multidistrict litigation to suggest that the systematic lack of checks and balances in our courts may benefit everyone but the plaintiffs. Multidistrict proceedings, which place a single judge in charge of similar lawsuits filed across the country, consume over one-third of the federal courts' pending civil docket. And these are not run-of-the-mill disputes. Litigation over products like opioids, Johnson & Johnson's baby powder, Bayer's permanent birth control Essure, and General Motors ignition switch defects are headline-grabbing media magnets. Federal judges certify a small handful of these proceedings as class actions, which affords them judicial safeguards, but as tort reform has made its way into civil procedure, it has effectively clamped down on class actions. As the continued suits over defective products suggest, however, those claims have not disappeared. Instead, they proceed as droves of individual suits packaged together by the courts and the lawyers. And for those mass torts, the risks for plaintiffs are significant: their lawyer may sell them out, and the jury trials they've come to expect are even rarer than the Perry Mason reruns that feature them"-- Provided by publisher.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. When Mass Torts Meet Multidistrict Litigation

The Shift Away from Mass Tort Class Actions

Judges' Unenviable Task

The Clamor for Coordination

The Push for Settlement and Its Many Rewards

Why Litigation Matters

2. Quid Pro Quo Arrangements?

Dealmakers Gerrymander Settlements

Defendants Negotiate to End All Lawsuits

Lead Plaintiffs' Attorneys Bargain for Their Fees

What Do Plaintiffs Receive?

3. The Rise of Repeat Players

Repeat Players

The Social Network

Social Networks, Group Decisions, and Amplified Error

Choosing Lead Lawyers

Do Leaders Owe Duties to Nonclients?

4. Judges as Bulwarks and Nudgers

Judges Nudge

Judicial Signals about the Merits

The Missing Merits

The Settlement Shove

Settlements' Handmaidens

Judicial Culture and Motivations

Dissecting Judicial Paternalism

Judicial Authority to Intervene?

5. When Multidistrict Litigation Settles into "Alternative Dispute Resolution"

Settling with Blinders On

Repeat Players, Part Deux

Privacy versus Equal Treatment

Self-Contained Appeals

Community Disengagement

Litigation as Contract Bargaining

6. Reforming Multidistrict Litigation

Nudging Lawyers, Not Plaintiffs

Incentivizing Attorney Loyalty

Tying Common-Benefit Fees to Plaintiffs' Outcomes

Empowering the Masses

Remanding Cases as Exit Opportunities

Conclusion

Data Collection

Data Analysis.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781108416979

1108416977

9781108404211

1108404219

OCLC:

1078955045