Existing legal limits to Security Council veto power in the face of atrocity crimes / Jennifer Trahan, New York University.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Trahan, Jennifer, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United Nations. Security Council--Voting.

United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council.

International criminal law.

Atrocities--Law and legislation.

Atrocities.

Voting registers.

Voting.

Physical Description:

xvii, 355 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Summary:

"This book examines veto use by the permanent members of the UN Security Council while atrocity crimes are being committed -- genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. The veto power, conferred by UN Charter Article 27(3), allows any one of the five permanent members--the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, or France--to block a substantive resolution being voted on within the Council by casting a negative vote. Both in the past, and today, permanent members use, or have used, their veto power to block resolutions, including those designed to curtail or alleviate the commission of atrocity crimes, with dire consequences sometimes resulting on the ground." Provided by publisher.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. The Origins and History of the Veto and Its Use

Introduction

1.1. The UN Charter Negotiations

1.1.1. Positions on the Veto Leading into the San Francisco Conference

1.1.2. Positions on the Veto at the San Francisco Conference

1.2. Early General Assembly Attempts to Avoid Security Council Paralysis during the Cold War

1.2.1. General Assembly Resolutions Calling for Veto Restraint

1.2.2. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution

1.2.3. Use of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution and Other Methods to Shift Debate to the General Assembly

1.3. Overview of Veto Use Including during the Commission of Atrocity Crimes

1.3.1. Overview of Veto Use

1.3.2. Veto Use and Veto Threats during the Commission of Atrocity Crimes

1.4. Security Council Reform Proposals

1.4.1. Proposed Reforms to the Composition of the Security Council

1.4.2. Recent Attempts to Curb Veto Use

1.5. The Rationale for Reconsidering How the Veto Is Used in the Face of Atrocity Crimes

2. Acting in the Face of Atrocity Crimes - Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

2.1. The Doctrine of "Humanitarian Intervention"

2.1.1. Limited Historical Precedent

2.1.2. The 1999 NATO Intervention in Kosovo

2.1.3. Lingering Wariness about "Humanitarian Intervention"

2.2. The Development of the "Responsibility to Protect"

2.2.1. Difficulties for R2P: Libya and Syria

2.2.1.1. Libya as R2P

2.2.1.2. Syria as an R2P Failure

2.2.2. The Need to Revitalize R2P: Emphasizing the "Hard Law" Obligations Underlying It

2.3. Revisiting the Legal Status of "Humanitarian Intervention" Post-R2P

2.3.1. Proposed Military Strikes in 2013 in Response to Chemical Weapons Attacks

2.3.2. Military Strikes in Syria in 2017 and 2018 in Response to Chemical Weapons Attacks

2.3.3. The Extent to Which "Humanitarian Intervention" Continues as a Viable Doctrine

2.3.4. The Relationship between "Humanitarian Intervention" and the International Criminal Court's Crime of Aggression

2.4. Conclusion

3. Initiatives to Voluntarily Restrain Veto Use as to the Face of Atrocity Crimes

3.1. The Different Approaches to Voluntary Veto Restraint as to the Face of Atrocity Crimes

3.1.1. The Responsibility Not to Veto within R2P

3.1.2. The "S5 Initiative"

3.1.3. The French/Mexican Initiative

3.1.4. The ACT Code of Conduct

3.1.5. The Proposal of "The Elders"

3.1.6. A US Proposal for Veto Restraint under the Obama Administration

3.2. Evaluation of the Different Approaches to Voluntary Veto Restraint

3.2.1. The Weight of the "Responsibility Not to Veto" as Articulated in These Initiatives

3.2.2. Variations as to the Different Approaches

3.2.2.1. Which Crimes to Include

3.2.2.2. Whether to Call for the Vetoing Permanent Member to Articulate Its Reasoning

3.2.2.3. Whether to Permit a Veto in the Face of "Vital National Interests" or "Vital State Interests"

3.2.2.4. Whether the Crimes Need to Be Occurring or the Threat of Their Occurrences Also Triggers the Obligation Not to Veto

3.2.2.5. Who Determines Whether Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, or War Crimes Are Occurring, or Are at Serious Risk of Occurring?

3.2.2.6. Whether to Include the Threat of Veto Use by a Permanent Member

3.2.2.7. Whether All Vetoes in the Face of Atrocity Crimes Should Be Encompassed

3.3. Conclusion

4. Questioning the Legality of Veto Use in the Face of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and/or War Crimes

The Need for an Approach Guided by Existing Hard Law Obligations

Summary of Legal Arguments

4.1. Consideration of the Relationship between Use of the Veto and Jus Cogens

4.1.1. Jus Cogens/Peremptory Norms

4.1.2. The Prohibitions of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and, at Least Certain, War Crimes Are Peremptory Norms Protected as Jus Cogens

4.1.3. The Content of the Peremptory Norms as to Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes

4.1.4. The Obligations of the UN and Its Organs, Including the Security Council, to Respect Jus Cogens Norms

4.1.4.1. The Security Council Is Not Above the Law

4.1.4.2. The Security Council Is Bound to Respect Jus Cogens Norms

4.1.5. Legal Consequences of Jus Cogens Norms Being Binding on the Security Council

4.1.5.1. The Security Council Cannot Explicitly Authorize Violations of Jus Cogens

4.1.5.2. The Security Council May Not Violate Jus Cogens in Its Resolutions/a Resolution That Conflicts with a Jus Cogens Norm Will Be Void

4.1.6. The Relationship between the Veto and Jus Cogens

4.1.6.1. The Veto Should Not Be Used in Circumstances Where It Has the Effect of Facilitating the Commission of Jus Cogens Violations

4.1.6.2. The Veto Should Not Be Used in a Way That Undermines the Duty of Other Security Council Members to Cooperate and Make an Appropriate Response to a Serious Breach of a Jus Cogens Norm

4.1.6.3. The Veto Should Be Used in a Way That Is Consistent with Jus Cogens

4.1.6.4. Individual Permanent Members Are Bound to Respect Jus Cogens

4.2. Limitations Imposed on the Security Council by the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations

4.2.1. The Obligation of the Security Council to Act in Accordance with the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations

4.2.2. Whether a Veto in the Face of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and/or War Crimes Accords with the Obligation to Act in Accordance with the "Purposes" of the United Nations

4.2.2.1. The "Purposes" of the United Nations

4.2.2.2. Veto Use Must Be in Accordance with the "Purposes" of the United Nations

4.2.3. Whether a Veto in the Face of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and/or War Crimes Accords with the Obligation to Act in Accordance with the "Principles" of the United Nations and the General Obligation of "Good Faith"

4.2.4. Whether the Vetoes Related to the Situation in Syria Are in Accordance with the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations

4.2.4.1. Resolutions Vetoed Related to the Situation in Syria

4.2.4.2. The Objections of States to Veto Use Related to the Situation in Syria and More Generally in the Face of Atrocity Crimes

4.2.43. Other Resolutions Did Not Obviate the Need for the Resolutions That Were Vetoed Related to the Situation in Syria

4.3. Consideration of the Treaty Obligations of Individual Permanent Member States

4.3.1. Legal Obligations under the Genocide Convention

4.3.2. Legal Obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions

4.3.3. Whether Legal Obligations Created under These Foundational Treaties Apply to States while Serving on the Security Council

4.3.4. Treaty Obligations Potentially Relevant to Veto Use

4.3.5. Treaty Obligations Potentially Relevant to Drafting, Negotiating, and Voting on Resolutions

4.3.6. Application of Foundational Treaty Obligations to Veto Use

4.3.6.1. The Situation in Myanmar

4.3.6.2. Veto Threats

4.3.6.3. The Situation in Syria

4.4. Seeking an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice and the Issue of Judicial Review

4.4.1. The ICJ May Review Security Council Actions for Compliance with the UN Charter and/or Other Bodies of International Law

4.4.2. Security Council Actions Do Not Constitute Nonjusticiable "Political" Question, at Least Where There Are Legal Standards against Which to Review Them

4.4.3. Why the IC) Should Exercise Its Discretion to Render an Advisory Opinion

4.4.4. Advisability of Seeking Judicial Review by the ICJ and Possible Alternatives

4.5. Conclusion

5. Case Studies - Veto Use Related to the Situation in Syria and Veto Threats Related to the Situation in Darfur

5.1. Analysis of Veto Use Related to the Situation in Syria

5.1.1. A Brief Background

5.1.2. The First Vetoes Related to the Situation in Syria: Blocking Condemnation of Crimes

5.1.2.1. Vetoing a Call to End Violence and Hold Perpetrators Accountable

5.1.2.2. Vetoing Condemnation of Arbitrary Detention, Enforced Disappearances, and Other Crimes

5.1.2.3. Vetoing Condemnation of Bombing and Shelling of Population Centers and Detention of Thousands in Government-Run Facilities

5.1.3. Vetoing Referral of the Situation in Syria to the ICC

5.1.3.1. Acceleration of Crimes

5.1.3.2. The Sarin Gas Attack on Al-Ghouta

5.1.3.3. The Dire Consequences of Siege Warfare

5.1.3.4. Vetoing ICC Referral

5.1.3.5. ISIL Crimes against the Yazidis

5.1.4. Vetoes Related to the Siege of Aleppo

5.1.4.1. The Siege of Aleppo

5.1.4.2. Vetoing Expressions of Outrage at the Alarming Number of Civilian Casualties, Including Those Caused by Indiscriminate Aerial Bombing, in Aleppo

5.1.4.3. Vetoing a Seven-Day Ceasefire in Aleppo That Would Have Allowed Humanitarian Assistance

5.1.5. Vetoes Related to Chemical Weapons Use

5.1.5.1. Attempts at Destroying Syria's Chemical Weapons Stockpile

5.1.5.2. Continued Chemical Weapons Use

5.1.5.3. Vetoing Condemnation of Chemical Weapons Use

5.1.5.4. Further Vetoing Condemnation of Chemical Weapons Use, and Requests for Documentation Such as Flight Plans and Access to Air Bases from Which Chemical Weapons Were Believed to Have Been Launched

5.1.5.5. Vetoing Renewal of the Mandate for Investigations That Would Have Attributed Responsibility to the Side Using Chemical Weapons

5.1.5.6. Further Vetoing Condemnation of Chemical Weapons Use, and Furthering Vetoing Renewal of the Mandate for Inspections That Would Have Attributed Responsibility

Contents note continued: 5.1.6. Overall Impact of the Vetoes Related to the Situation in Syria

5.2. Analysis of Veto Threats Related to the Situation in Darfur

5.2.1. A Brief Background

5.2.2. How Veto Threats Hampered the Security Council's Ability to Pass Resolutions Related to the Situation in Darfur

5.2.3. How Veto Threats Weakened Sanctions

5.2.3.1. The First Implicit Threat to Veto Sanctions

5.2.3.2. A Second Threat to Veto Sanctions

5.2.3.3. The Third Threat to Veto Sanctions

5.2.3.4. The Fourth Threat to Veto Sanctions

5.2.3.5. The Fifth Threat to Veto Sanctions

5.2.4. How Veto Threats Weakened Peacekeeping

5.2.4.1. The First Veto Threat Related to Peacekeeping

5.2.4.2. The Second Veto Threat Related to Peacekeeping

5.2.4.3. The Lingering Impact of Veto Threats Weakening Peacekeeping

5.2.5. Threats Blocking Follow-Up on the ICC Referral

5.2.6. Overall Impact of the Veto Threats Regarding the Situation in Darfur

5.3. Conclusion.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Other Format:

Online version: Trahan, Jennifer, Existing legal limits to Security Council veto power in the face of atrocity

ISBN:

9781108487016

1108487017

OCLC:

1135255499