The epistemology of groups / Jennifer Lackey.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lackey, Jennifer, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social groups--Philosophy.

Social epistemology.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (x, 200 pages).

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2021]

Summary:

Jennifer Lackey presents a ground-breaking exploration of the epistemology of groups, and its implications for group agency and responsibility. She argues that group belief and knowledge depend on what individual group members do or are capable of doing, while being subject to group-level normative requirements.

Contents:

Cover

The Epistemology of Groups

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

0.1 On the Very Existence of Group Beliefs

0.2 The Nature of Groups

0.3 Chapter Overviews

0.4 The Bigger Picture

Chapter 1: Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit

1.1 Summative and Non-Summative Views of Group Belief

1.2 Group Lies and Group Bullshit

1.3 Judgment Fragility

1.4 Base Fragility

1.5 The Group Agent Account

1.6 Conclusion

Chapter 2: What Is Justified Group Belief?

2.1 Divergence Arguments

2.2 The Paradigmatic Inflationary Non-Summativist View: The Joint Acceptance Account

2.3 Problems for the Joint Acceptance Account

2.4 Revisiting Divergence Arguments

2.5 Deflationary Summativism, the Group Justification Paradox, and the Defeater Problem

2.6 The Collective Evidence Problem

2.7 The Group Normative Obligations Problem

2.8 A Condorcet-Inspired Account of Justified Group Belief

2.9 The Group Epistemic Agent Account

2.10 Central Objection to the Group Epistemic Agent Account

2.11 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Group Knowledge

3.1 Social Knowledge

3.2 Social Knowledge and Action

3.3 Social Knowledge and Defeaters

3.4 Knowing, Being in a Position to Know, and Should Have Known

3.5 Collective Knowledge

3.6 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Group Assertion

4.1 Two Kinds of Group Assertion

4.2 Having the Authority to Be a Spokesperson

4.3 The Autonomy of Spokespersons

4.4 Coordinated and Authority-Based Group Assertion

4.5 Two Other Accounts

4.6 Group Assertion Is Not Reducible to Individual Assertion

4.7 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Group Lies

5.1 Individual Lies

5.2 Counterexamples to the Traditional View of Lying

5.3 Non-Deception Accounts of Lying

5.4 Back to Deception

5.5 Summativism and Sufficiency

5.6 Summativism and Necessity

5.7 The Joint Acceptance Account of Group Lies

5.8 Group Lies

5.9 Conclusion

References

Index

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2020.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-190445-7

0-19-263789-4

0-19-263790-8