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The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons / Hamid Vahid.

Taylor & Francis eBooks Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Vahid, Hamid, 1959- author.
Contributor:
Taylor & Francis eBooks.
Series:
Routledge studies in epistemology
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Knowledge, Theory of.
Justification (Theory of knowledge).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (ix, 231 pages) : illustrations.
Place of Publication:
New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.
System Details:
text file
Biography/History:
Hamid Vahid is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Iran. He is the author of Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge (2005) and The Epistemology of Belief (2009).
Contents:
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
PART I The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
1 Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework
1.1 The Ontology and Typology of Reasons: An Opinionated Introduction
1.1.1 Possessed Reasons and Rationality
1.2 The Treating Requirement: From Doxastic States to Competences
1.3 The Treating Requirement: From Available Reasons to Possessed Justifying Reasons
2 A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
2.1 The Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
2.2 Analyzing Dispositions and Disposition Ascriptions
2.3 Propositional and Doxastic Justification: A Dispositional Analysis
3 Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation
3.1 The Problem of the Basing Relation
3.1.1 Acting for a Reason and the Problem of Causal Deviance
3.1.2 The Problem of Causal Deviance and the Epistemic Basing Relation
3.2 Dispositions and the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains
Appendix: Propositionalism: Normative and Motivating Reasons
PART II Perceptual Reasons
4 The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
4.1 Nondoxastic Justification: A Rough Sketch of the Territory
4.2 Internalism and Externalism: The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
4.2.1 Some Externalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Burge on Perceptual Entitlement
4.2.2 Some Internalist Accounts of Perceptual Justification: Dogmatism and Conservatism
5 Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
5.1 Wright's Conservative Account of the Value of Perceptual Experience
5.2 Deontological Justification and Conservatism
5.2.1 Deontological Conservatism
5.3 Deontological Conservatism vs. (Some) Other Conservative Views
5.3.1 Entitlement to Trust a Source of Information
5.3.2 Full-Blooded Entitlement
6 Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
6.1 Challenging Dogmatism: Divorcing the Rational and the Justified
6.2 Defending Internalism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
6.2.1 Belief: Accessing Reasons in Doxastic Terms
6.2.2 Experience: Accessing Reasons in Nondoxastic Terms
6.3 Dogmatism and the Challenge of Cognitive Penetration
PART III Consequences
7 Higher-Order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
7.1 Taxonomy of the Defeaters: Rebutters and Undercutters
7.2 The Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
7.3 Higher-Order Evidence and State-Given Reasons
8 The Nature of Inference
8.1 The Nature of Inference: Problems and Proposals
8.2 The Dispositional Account of Reason-Possession and the Taking Condition
8.2.1 Logical Knowledge
8.2.2 Reasons and Reasoning
9 The Epistemic Value of Emotions
9.1 The Perceptual Model: The Epistemic Value of Emotions
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Electronic reproduction. London Available via World Wide Web.
Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 25, 2020).
Other Format:
Print version: Vahid, Hamid, 1959- The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons
ISBN:
9781003052401
1003052401
9781000179026
1000179028
9781000179002
1000179001
9781000179019
100017901X
Publisher Number:
40030218600
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.

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