Game theory for political scientists / James D. Morrow.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Morrow, James D., 1957-

Contributor:

JSTOR (Online Service)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Political science--Methodology.

Political science.

Game theory.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Place of Publication:

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [1994]

System Details:

text file

Summary:

Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. This book is the first comprehensive attempt to adapt contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems (with solutions) suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to modeling problems in four areas: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques and brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

Contents:

Cover Page

Half-title Page

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication Page

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Preface and Acknowledgments

Chapter 1: Overview

What Is Game Theory?

What Can You Do with Game Theory?

Four Problems in Political Science

Why Model?

The Rational Choice Approach to Social Modeling

How to Use This Book

The Plan of This Book

Further Reading

Textbooks

Supplementary Readings

Esoteric Books on Game Theory

Journals

Chapter 2: Utility Theory

The Concept of Rationality

How Do Utility Functions Predict Actions?

An Example: Nixon's Christmas Bombing

Certainty, Risk, and Uncertainty

Utility Theory under the Condition of Risk

Some Common Misconceptions about Utility Theory

Utility Functions and Types of Preferences

A Simple Example: The Calculus of Deterrence

Another Simple Example: The Decision to Vote

Why Might Utility Theory Not Work?

Review

Chapter 3: Specifying a Game

Formalizing a Situation: Deterrence in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Games in Extensive Form

Games in Strategic Form

Chapter 4: Classical Game Theory

Defining the Terms of Classical Game Theory

Domination, Best Replies, and Equilibrium

Mixed Strategies

The Minmax Theorem and Equilibria of Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games

Characteristics of Nash Equilibria

Nash Equilibria and Common Conjectures

Rationalizability

Political Reform in Democracies

Candidate Competition in the Spatial Model of Elections

A Very Brief Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory

Chapter 5: Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection

Backwards Induction

Subgame Perfection

Sophisticated Voting

Agenda Control

Legislative Rules and Structure-Induced Equilibria

The Rubinstein Bargaining Model

Bargaining in Legislatures

Why Might Backwards Induction Yield Counterintuitive Results?

In General Legislative Studies

Chapter 6: Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

Bayes's Theorem

The Preference for Biased Information

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

Nuclear Deterrence

In General Comparative Politics

Chapter 7: More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria

Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies

Perfect Equilibrium

Sequential Equilibrium

Deterrence and the Signaling of Resolve

Why Vote?"" Redux

In General Electoral Politics

Chapter 8: Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs

Signaling Games

The Informational Role of Congressional Committees

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Deterrence and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs

An Introduction to Restrictions on Beliefs

Cheap Talk"" and Coordination

In General International Politics

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 355-363) and index.

Electronic reproduction. New York Available via World Wide Web.

Other Format:

Print version:

ISBN:

9780691213200

0691213208

0691034303

9780691034300

Publisher Number:

99985881083

9780691034300

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.