Debating the a priori / Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Boghossian, Paul A. (Paul Artin), 1957- lat, author.

Williamson, Timothy, lat, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online

Oxford scholarship online lat

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Intuition.

A priori.

Inference.

Comprehension.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xi, 259 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2020]

Summary:

This text records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than 15 years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Since reason is central to philosophical method, there are associated implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. In particular, the discussion raises fundamental concerns about how to approach epistemology.

Contents:

Cover

Debating the A Priori

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Preface

Publisher's Acknowledgements

Chapter 1: Analyticity Reconsidered

1

Belief, apriority, and indeterminacy

Analyticity: Metaphysical or epistemological?

The metaphysical concept

The epistemological concept

2

'Two Dogmas' and the rejection of Frege-analyticity

Skeptical theses about analyticity

Non-factualism about Frege-analyticity

The error thesis about Frege-analyticity

3

The analyticity of logic

The classical view and Implicit Definition

Implicit Definition and Non-Factualism

Implicit Definition and Conventionalism

Quine against Implicit Definition: Regress

Quine against Implicit Definition: Constitutive truth

Implicit Definition, justification, and entitlement

Conclusion

Notes

Chapter 2: Blind Reasoning

1. The Question

2. Inferential Externalism

3. Inferential Internalism

4. Rational Insight

5. Rational Insight and Carrollian Circularity

6. Blind Yet Blameless Inference: Deflationary Options

7. Blind Yet Blameless Inference: Concept Constitution

8. Problems for the Meaning-Entitlement Connection

9. Defective Concepts and Blameless Inference

10. Conclusion

Chapter 3: Understanding and Inference

1. Introduction

2. Logical Unorthodoxy and Concept Possession

3. Pejoratives and Conventional Implicature

4. Stipulated Possession Conditions

5. Conditional and Unconditional Concepts

6. Unique Characterizations and Unique Realizations

7. Logical Concepts

8. Conclusion

Chapter 4: Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic

Notes

Chapter 9: Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?: A Reply to Williamson

The resilience of the a priori

A new style of skepticism

A problem for characterizing 'experience'

Discussion of Williamson's problem for characterizing 'experience'

Justifiers as propositions

Proof and memory

Resolving the puzzle

Williamson's central argument

Discussion of Williamson's central argument

Using the imagination to justify belief in (2)

Using the imagination to justify belief in (1)

4

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Other Format:

Print version:

ISBN:

9780192592552