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New Methuselahs : the ethics of life extension / John K. Davis.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Davis, John K., 1956- author.
- Series:
- Basic bioethics
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Longevity--Moral and ethical aspects.
- Longevity.
- Longevity--Philosophy.
- Medical technology--Moral and ethical aspects.
- Medical technology.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (ix, 354 pages).
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press, [2018]
- System Details:
- text file
- Summary:
- An examination of the ethical issues raised by the possibility of human life extension, including its desirability, unequal access, and the threat of overpopulation.
- Contents:
- 1.2 Optimism about life extension p. 7
- 1.3 Possible methods of life extension and the basic processes of aging p. 8
- 1.4 Is it possible to reverse aging? p. 15
- 1.5 Why slowing aging might be harder than we realize p. 17
- 1.6 Are any life extension methods available right now? p. 18
- 1.7 How long would we live? p. 19
- 1.8 Misconceptions about what life extension would be like p. 20
- 1.9 Not everyone thinks life extension is desirable p. 22
- 1.10 Why worry about this now? p. 25
- 1.11 A survey of the moral issues p. 29
- 2 The Haves-Would Extended Life Be Boring? p. 37
- 2.1 Do you want to live forever? p. 37
- 2.2 A dilemma for the very, very old p. 38
- 2.3 Can you avoid boredom without fading away? p. 41
- 2.4 The boredom pill p. 43
- 2.5 How to survive your survival p. 47
- 2.6 If boredom is unavoidable, is that a reason not to start extended life at all? p. 53
- 3 The Haves-Death Benefits and the Human Condition p. 55
- 3.2 Making a case for extended life p. 55
- 3.3 General problems with bioconservative arguments p. 57
- 3.4 Accepting death p. 59
- 3.5 Motivation and procrastination p. 60
- 3.6 The meaning of life p. 61
- 3.7 Character and virtue p. 63
- 3.8 Narcissism and transcendence p. 66
- 3.9 Adaptive preferences (sour grapes) p. 67
- 3.10 Unscheduled death and the new human condition p. 69
- 4 The Will-nots-Life Extension and Suicide p. 77
- 4.2 Would making life extension available reduce the death benefits for Will-nots? p. 78
- 4.3 If you refuse or discontinue life extension, are you committing suicide? p. 80
- 4.4 If refusing or discontinuing life extension is suicide, is it immoral? p. 85
- 5 Everyone-Social Consequences p. 93
- 5.2 Potential bad social consequences p. 94
- 5.3 Potential good social consequences p. 99
- 6 Everyone-The Malthusian Threat p. 103
- 6.2 Will life extension cause a Malthusian crisis? p. 104
- 6.3 A policy to prevent a Malthusian crisis: Forced Choice p. 119
- 6.4 Practical problems with Forced Choice p. 122
- 6.5 Reproductive ethics and Forced Choice p. 124
- 6.6 Is Forced Choice an oppressive government intrusion into private reproductive choices? p. 126
- 6.7 What if some countries impose Forced Choice and others do not? p. 126
- 6.8 The demographic formula used in this chapter p. 129
- 7 The Have-nots-Distress and the Death Burden p. 131
- 7.2 Distress p. 132
- 7.3 The death burden p. 135
- 7.4 Can we avoid making the death burden worse if we avoid developing life extension? p. 140
- 8 The Have-nots-Equality and Access to Life Extension p. 143
- 8.2 Equality p. 144
- 8.3 Inequality as a reason for collective suttee p. 147
- 8.4 What if other needs are more pressing? p. 149
- 8.5 Who has a duty to subsidize life extension for Have-nots? p. 152
- 8.6 What if it's possible to provide access to some Have-nots but not possible to provide it to all of them? p. 156
- 8.7 If we are sure that many Haves will breach their duty to the Have-nots, is that a reason to deny it to everyone? p. 158
- 9 Deciding among the Groups-Maximizing Welfare p. 161
- 9.2 Midlevel principles, moral theory, and doing applied ethics p. 162
- 9.3 What it means to maximize welfare p. 166
- 9.4 Objection: we don't have enough information p. 167
- 9.5 Maximizing welfare in the long run p. 171
- 9.6 How to argue that a world without life extension has greater net welfare than a world with it p. 180
- 9.7 Peter Singer's objection p. 182
- 10 Deciding among the Groups-Which Rights Are Relevant? p. 187
- 10.2 Rights and welfare p. 187
- 10.3 The right to equality favors neither Inhibition nor Promotion p. 189
- 10.4 The right to self-determination favors neither Inhibition nor Promotion p. 191
- 10.5 The right against harm favors Inhibition p. 195
- 11 Deciding among the Groups-Rights versus Welfare p. 201
- 11.2 How to weigh rights against welfare p. 201
- 11.3 Weighing Have-not rights against welfare p. 209
- 11.4 Weighing Will-not rights against welfare p. 213
- 11.5 Two versions of Promotion p. 216
- 12 Enhancement Worries p. 219
- 12.2 Risk and the precautionary principle p. 222
- 12.3 Authenticity p. 226
- 12.4 Sandel's concern about "giftedness" p. 228
- 12.5 It's not natural p. 231
- 12.6 The value of a natural life span p. 234
- 12.7 Playing God p. 236
- 12.8 Fukuyama, human nature, and human rights p. 236
- 12.9 Is aging a disease? p. 237
- 13 Policy Recommendations and List of Conclusions p. 243
- 13.1 Policy recommendations p. 243
- 13.2 List of conclusions p. 248.
- Notes:
- OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
- ISBN:
- 9780262347228
- 0262347229
- OCLC:
- 1046676926
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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