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The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs / Lisa Bortolotti.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Bortolotti, Lisa, author.
Series:
Oxford scholarship online.
Oxford scholarship online
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Irrationalism (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xi, 164 pages)
Edition:
First edition.
Place of Publication:
Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2020]
Summary:
Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
Contents:
The Epistemic Innocence Project
Distorted Memory Beliefs
Confabulated Explanations
Elaborated Delusional Beliefs
Motivated Delusional Beliefs
Optimistically Biased Beliefs
The Significance of Epistemic Innocence.
Notes:
This edition also issued in print: 2020.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
0-19-260944-0
0-19-189626-8
0-19-260943-2

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