Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution / Keith N. Hylton.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hylton, Keith N., author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Antitrust law--United States.

Antitrust law.

Antitrust law--Economic aspects.

United States.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 413 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003.

System Details:

text file

PDF

Summary:

This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.

Contents:

1 Economics 1

II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly 9

III. Further Topics 21

2 Law and Policy 27

I. Some Interpretation Issues 28

II. Enacting the Antitrust Law 30

III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? 40

3 Enforcement 43

I. Optimal Enforcement Theory 43

II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws 47

4 Cartels 68

II. Conscious Parallelism 73

5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine 90

I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law 90

II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule 104

6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule 113

I. The Case for Price Fixing 113

II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments 116

III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule 129

7 Agreement 132

I. The Development of Inference Doctrine 133

II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory 140

8 Facilitating Mechanisms 144

I. Data Dissemination Cases 145

II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices 154

III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics 160

9 Boycotts 166

I. Pre-Socony 166

II. Post-Socony 170

III. Post-BMI/Sylvania 181

10 Monopolization 186

I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine 186

II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases 202

III. Predatory Pricing 212

11 Power 230

I. Measuring Market Power 230

II. Determinants of Market Power 235

III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane 237

IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa 239

V. Measuring Power: Guidelines 243

12 Attempts 244

I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine 244

II. Dangerous Probability Requirement 248

13 Vertical Restraints 252

I. Resale Price Maintenance 252

II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints 262

III. Manufacturer Retains Title 267

IV. Agreement 270

14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing 279

II. Early Cases 284

III. Development of Per-Se Rule 286

IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule 295

V. Technological Tying 301

VI. Exclusive Dealing 303

15 Horizontal Mergers 311

I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law 311

II. Horizontal Merger Law 317

16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate 333

I. Vertical Mergers 333

II. Conglomerate Mergers 344

17 Antitrust and the State 352

I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 354

II. Parker Doctrine 371

III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines 375.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Other Format:

Print version:

ISBN:

9780511610158

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.