Game theory : an introduction / Steven Tadelis.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tadelis, Steve.

Contributor:

John Lammey Stewart Memorial Library Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory.

Physical Description:

xv, 396 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm

Place of Publication:

Princeton ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, [2013]

Summary:

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. -- from back cover.

Contents:

Part I: Rational decision making. The single-person decision problem

Introducing uncertainty and time

Part II: Static games of complete information. Preliminaries

Rationality and common knowledge

Pinning down beliefs: Nash equilibrium

Mixed strategies

Part III: Dynamic games of complete information. Preliminaries

Credibility and sequential rationality

Multistage games

Repeated games

Strategic bargaining

Part IV: Static games of incomplete information. Bayesian games

Auctions and competitive bidding

Mechanism design

Part V: Dynamic games of incomplete information. Sequential rationality with incomplete information

Signaling games

Building a reputation

Information transmission and cheap talk

Mathematical appendix.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-388) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the John Lammey Stewart Memorial Library Fund.

ISBN:

9780691129082

0691129088

OCLC:

796355097