Morality and epistemic judgement : the argument from analogy / Christopher Cowie.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cowie, Christopher, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (vii, 236 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Argument from analogy

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019.

Summary:

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral0judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.

Contents:

Pt. I THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

1.Moral Error Theory

1.1.Preliminaries

1.2.The Internalism-Based Argument: Commitment Premise

1.3.The Internalism-Based Argument: Existential Premise

1.4.The Irreducibility-Based Argument: Commitment Premise

1.5.The Irreducibility-Based Argument: Existential Premise

1.6.Contrasting the Arguments

1.7.Conclusion

2.The Analogy

2.1.Preliminaries

2.2.The Parity Premise: Internalism-Based

2.3.The Parity Premise: Irreducibility-Based

2.4.Das, Finlay, and Parity

2.5.The Epistemic Existence Premise

2.6.Roadmap and Strategic Omissions

2.7.Conclusion

pt. II AGAINST THE ANALOGY

3.Against Internalism-Parity

3.1.Internalism-Parity and the Basic Rationale

3.2.Ordinary Explanation and Trivial Truths

3.3.Ordinary Explanation and Trivial Truths in Morality

3.4.Considered Propositions and Negative Reasons

3.5.The Conventionalism Criticism

3.6.Work for Epistemic Institutionalists

3.7.Conclusion

4.Against Internalism-Parity: A Supplementary Argument

4.1.The Structure of the Argument

4.2.Action-Explanation Arguments

4.3.The Upshot and Several Objections

4.4.Less Clear-Cut Cases

4.5.Conclusion

5.Against Irreducibility-Parity

5.1.Irreducibility-Parity and the Basic Rationale

5.2.Streumer on Irreducibility-Parity

5.3.Heathwood on Parity

5.4.The Surrogate Strategy

5.5.Conclusion

pt. III ELABORATION

6.The Conventionalism Criticism

6.1.An Attitudinal Disanalogy

6.2.The Belief-Based Rationale

6.3.The Intentional Interpretation

6.4.The Evolutionary Interpretation

6.5.The Concept of Belief

6.6.Conclusion

7.Simple Veritism

7.1.Criticisms of Simple Veritism

7.2.Defending Veritism

7.3.Knowledge as the Epistemic Aim

7.4.The Anti-Consequentialist Argument

7.5.Veritism and Credence-Based Views

7.6.Conclusion

8.The Normativity of Evidence

8.1.Evidence and Probability

8.2.The Nature of Probability Problem

8.3.The Problem of Background Information

8.4.The Degree of Likelihood Problem

8.5.Conclusion

pt. IV FALLBACKS AND LOOSE ENDS

9.Error Theory and Thought

9.1.Normativism and Error Theory

9.2.Against Conceptual Normativism

9.3.Moore's Paradox and Conceptual Normativism

9.4.An Error Theory of Belief?

9.5.Normativity and Deliberation

9.6.Conclusion

10.A Puzzling Combination

10.1.The Structure of the Argument

10.2.Moral Debunking and Dispensability

10.3.Epistemic Debunking and Dispensability

10.4.A Possible Error Theorist

10.5.Conclusion

11.Conclusion.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-258043-4

0-19-187866-9

0-19-258042-6