Reform capacity / Johannes Lindvall. [electronic resource]
- Format:
-
- Author/Creator:
-
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
-
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)
- Edition:
- First edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Summary:
- It is often said that effective government requires a concentration of power. If we want our political leaders to adjust public policies to changing economic, social, and political circumstances, we should, in this view, leave our leaders alone: we should put in place electoral procedures that identify a clear winner in each election, and then we should let the winning political party govern without having to cooperate with others. The argument in this text is that this view is mistaken, since it seriously underestimates the ability of political decision makers to overcome democratic paralysis by compensating losers (groups that stand to lose from a reform).
- Contents:
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- Two theories of effective government
- Compensating the losers
- How reforms fail
- Formal and informal power
- Future-oriented reforms
- Reform capacity.
- Notes:
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- This edition previously issued in print: 2017.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on June 5, 2017).
- Other Format:
- Print version :
- ISBN:
- 0-19-182113-6
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