The political economy of labour market institutions / Gilles Saint-Paul.
- Format:
-
- Author/Creator:
-
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
-
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (289 p.)
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- This text examines why labour market institutions such as employment protection, unemployment benefits, and relative wage rigidies exist, what role they play in society, why they seem so persistent, and whether reform can be politically viable.
- Contents:
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- Contents; Introduction; I: The support for labour market regulations; 1 The no-rent society; 1.1 Basic notions; 1.2 Introducing rents; 1.3 A more general result about the support for free markets; 1.4 Conclusion; 2 A less perfect world; 2.1 Two dimensions of redistributive conflict; 2.2 The structure of regulation: rents vs. outside options; 2.3 Heterogeneity and the support for minimum wages; 2.4 Determinants of the rent: exposure and elasticity; 2.5 Labour market regulation vs. the fiscal system; 3 Wage rigidity and social cohesion; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Voting on redistributive taxation
- 3.3 The role of elasticity3.4 Rigidity as a source of cohesion; 3.5 Inequality; 3.6 Exposure; 3.7 Lessons from a more general framework; 3.8 Conclusion; 4 Employment protection; 4.1 The wage-exposure trade-off; 4.2 Beyond unanimity: impact of tenure on the total rent; 4.3 Deriving the wage-exposure schedule; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 Unemployment benefits; 5.1 Insurance effects; 5.2 Employment effects; 5.3 Wage effects: reintroducing distributive conflict; 5.4 Active labour market policies; 5.5 Conclusion; II: The political economy of labour market reform; 6 The constituency effect
- 6.1 Reform: a conceptual problem6.2 Rents and the constituency effect; 6.3 Is status quo bias a problem?; 6.4 Factors increasing the severity of the status quo bias; 6.5 The case of employment protection; 6.6 Other examples; 6.7 The role of labour reallocation; 6.8 An application to reform design; 6.9 Another application: past events and initial conditions; 6.10 Summary; 7 The identifiability effect; 7.1 The basic arithmetics of identifiability; 7.2 Determination of the decisive voter; 7.3 Example: status quo bias in a simple wage-setting model
- 7.4 Application: business cycles and labour market reform7.5 Concluding comments; 8 Two-tier systems; 8.1 A two-tier reform; 8.2 Consensus in the case of a 'pure' two-tier system; 8.3 Low exposure and lock-in; 8.4 Political dynamics; 8.5 Impact of restrictions on the use of flexible contracts; 8.6 Summary; 9 Politico-economic complementarities; 9.1 The exposure-rents-protection nexus; 9.2 A counterexample: unemployment benefits; 9.3 Complementarities across institutions; 9.4 Conclusion; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y
- Notes:
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- Description based upon print version of record.
- Description based on print version record.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. [269]-275) and index.
- ISBN:
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- 9786612052392
- 1-282-05239-X
- 0-19-152206-6
- OCLC:
- 344105678
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