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Game theory and economic modelling / David M. Kreps.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Kreps.
Contributor:
David M..
Series:
Clarendon Lectures in Economics
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Competition.
Cooperation.
Econometric models.
Game theory.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (204 p.)
Other Title:
Clarendon lectures in economics.
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
This book offers an introduction to game theory, for academics and undergraduates interested in economic theory, but with no prior knowledge of game theory. It is written in non-technical language and concepts are developed as the book progresses. Game theory is currently a very popular tool of analysis, and this book looks at reasons why this is so. This is the first title to be published in the Clarendon Lectures in Economics series (see overleaf).The Clarendon Lectures in EconomicsThese lectures were established in 1987. They consist of coherent sets of three to four lectures given by disti
Contents:
Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. The standard; 3. Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory; Strategic form games; Extensive form games; Extensive and strategic form games; Dominance; Nash equilibrium; 4. The successes of game theory; Taxonomy based on the strategic form; Dynamics and extensive form games; Incredible threats and incredible promises; Credible threats and promises: Co-operation and reputation; The importance of what players know about others; Interactions among parties holding private information; Concluding remarks; 5. The problems of game theory
The need for precise protocolsToo many equilibria and no way to choose; Choosing among equilibria with refinements; The rules of the game; 6. Bounded rationality and retrospection; Why study Nash equilibria?; The case for bounded rationality and retrospection; A line of attack; Historical antecedents and recent examples; Objections to this general approach, with rebuttals; Similarities: Or, Deduction and prospection is bounded rationality and retrospection; The other problems of game theory; Final words; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; I; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; Z
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
ISBN:
0-19-828381-4
1-281-98947-9
0-19-152133-7
9786611989477
OCLC:
344105644

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