The logic of American nuclear strategy : why strategic superiority matters / Matthew Kroenig.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kroenig, Matthew, author.

Series:

Bridging the Gap

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nuclear weapons--Government policy--United States.

Nuclear weapons.

United States--Military policy.

United States.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (264 pages).

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the US need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the US needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the US has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory argues that the explanation is simple - policymakers are wrong. This work takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy.

Contents:

Part 1. The advantages of nuclear advantages

Toward a new theory of nuclear deterrence:

The superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory

Nuclear war outcomes

The correlates of nuclear crisis outcomes

The mechanisms of nuclear crisis outcomes

Nuclear deterrence and compellence

Part 2. The disadvantages of nuclear advantages?

Strategic stability

Arms races

Nonproliferation

The defense budget

Conclusion.

Notes:

Previously issued in print: 2018.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-084920-7

0-19-087059-1

0-19-084919-3