An introduction to the theory of mechanism design / Tilman Börgers ; with a chapter by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Börgers, Tilman, author.

Contributor:

Krähmer, Daniel, contributor.

Strausz, Roland, contributor.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (263 p.)

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2015.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

What is the best auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organise themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organised? These questions are the subject of the economic theory of mechanism design. Tilman Börgers' book presents this theory carefully and rigorously. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics will find an exposition of the classic theory of mechanism design, followed by chapters that take the reader to the frontiers of current research in the area.

Contents:

""Cover""; ""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""1 Introduction""; ""2 Screening""; ""2.1 Introduction""; ""2.2 Pricing a Single Indivisible Good""; ""2.3 Nonlinear Pricing""; ""2.4 Bundling""; ""2.5 Remarks on the Literature""; ""2.6 Problems""; ""3 Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples""; ""3.1 Introduction""; ""3.2 Single Unit Auctions""; ""3.2.1 Setup""; ""3.2.2 Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation Principle""; ""3.2.3 Characterizing Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality""; ""3.2.4 Expected Revenue Maximization""; ""3.2.5 Welfare Maximization""

""3.2.6 Numerical Examples""""3.3 Public Goods""; ""3.3.1 Setup""; ""3.3.2 Incentive-Compatible and Individually Rational Direct Mechanisms""; ""3.3.3 Ex Ante and Ex Post Budget Balance""; ""3.3.4 Welfare Maximization""; ""3.3.5 Profit Maximization""; ""3.3.6 A Numerical Example""; ""3.4 Bilateral Trade""; ""3.4.1 Setup""; ""3.4.2 Direct Mechanisms""; ""3.4.3 Welfare Maximization""; ""3.4.4 Profit Maximization""; ""3.4.5 A Numerical Example""; ""3.5 Remarks on the Literature""; ""3.6 Problems""; ""4 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: Examples""; ""4.1 Introduction""; ""4.2 Single Unit Auctions""

""4.2.1 Setup""""4.2.2 Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation Principle""; ""4.2.3 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Ex Post Individual Rationality""; ""4.2.4 Canonical Auctions""; ""4.3 Public Goods""; ""4.3.1 Setup""; ""4.3.2 Direct Mechanisms""; ""4.3.3 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Ex Post Individual Rationality""; ""4.3.4 Canonical Mechanisms""; ""4.3.5 Ex Post Exact Budget Balance""; ""4.4 Bilateral Trade""; ""4.4.1 Setup""

""4.4.2 Dominant Strategy Incentive-Compatible and Ex Post Individually Rational Direct Mechanisms""""4.4.3 Canonical Mechanisms""; ""4.4.4 Ex Post Exact Budget Balance""; ""4.5 Remarks on the Literature""; ""4.6 Problems""; ""5 Incentive Compatibility""; ""5.1 Introduction""; ""5.2 Setup""; ""5.3 Weak Monotonicity""; ""5.4 Cyclical Monotonicity""; ""5.5 Cyclical Monotonicity When Outcomes Are Lotteries""; ""5.6 One-Dimensional Type Spaces""; ""5.7 Rich Type Spaces""; ""5.8 Revenue Equivalence""; ""5.9 Individual Rationality""; ""5.10 Remarks on the Literature""; ""5.11 Problems""

""6 Bayesian Mechanism Design""""6.1 Introduction""; ""6.2 Setup""; ""6.3 Independent Types""; ""6.4 Correlated Types""; ""6.4.1 Framework""; ""6.4.2 Failure of Revenue Equivalence""; ""6.4.3 Characterizing Bayesian Incentive Compatibility""; ""6.4.4 A Numerical Example""; ""6.4.5 Individual Rationality and Budget Balance""; ""6.4.6 Discussion""; ""6.5 Remarks on the Literature""; ""6.6 Problems""; ""7 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms""; ""7.1 Introduction""; ""7.2 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility""; ""7.3 Implementing Efficient Decision Rules""

""7.4 Positive Association of Differences""

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9780190244682

0190244682

9780190244699

0190244690

9780199875887

019987588X

OCLC:

905853982