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Natural justice / Ken Binmore.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Binmore, K. G., 1940- author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Justice.
- Fairness.
- Social ethics.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (224 p.)
- Place of Publication:
- New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- This book lays out foundations for a ""science of morals."" Binmore uses game theory as a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. He reinterprets classical social contract ideas within a game-theory framework and generates new insights into the fundamental questions of social philosophy. In contrast to the previous writing in moral philosophy that relied on vague notion such as ""societal well-being"" and ""moral duty,"" Binmore begins with individuals; rational decision-makers with the ability to empathize with one another. Any social arrangement that prescribes them to act against
- Contents:
- Cover Page; Title page; Copyright Page; Preface; Contents; 1 Moral Science; 1.1 Evolutionary Ethics; 1.2 Mudslinging; 1.3 Social Contracts; 1.4 Stability; 1.5 Efficiency; 1.6 Fairness; 1.7 Reform; 2 Bargaining; 2.1 Realistic Bargaining; 2.2 The Meeting Game; 2.3 Bargaining Problems; 2.4 The Nash Bargaining Solution; 2.5 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility; 2.6 Social Indices; 2.7 The Utilitarian Bargaining Solution; 2.8 The Egalitarian Bargaining Solution; 2.9 Utilitarianism versus Egalitarianism; 2.10 Enforcement; 2.11 Cultural Evolution; 2.12 Signifying Nothing?; 3 Battle of the Isms
- 3.1 Kicking up Dust3.2 Empiricism; 3.3 Naturalism; 3.4 Relativism; 3.5 Reductionism; 3.6 Nil desperandum!; 4 Equilibrium; 4.1 Inventing Right and Wrong; 4.2 Toy Games; 4.3 Cooperation and Conflict; 4.4 Mixed Strategies; 4.5 The Prisoners' Dilemma; 4.6 Multiple Equilibria; 4.7 Nash Demand Game; 4.8 Out-of-Equilibrium Behavior; 5 Reciprocity; 5.1 Tit-for-Tat; 5.2 Folk Theorem; 5.3 Punishment; 5.4 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?; 5.5 Emergent Phenomena; 5.6 Unpleasant Behavior; 5.7 Free for All?; 6 Duty; 6.1 The Good, the Right and the Seemly; 6.2 Rights; 6.3 Dressing Up; 6.4 Moral Responsibility
- 7 Kinship7.1 Sympathy; 7.2 Kin Selection; 7.3 Social Insects; 7.4 Modifying Hamilton's Rule?; 7.5 Learning to Play an Equilibrium; 7.6 Extending the Family; 7.7 Warm Glow; 8 Empathy; 8.1 Empathetic Preferences; 8.2 Empathetic Identification; 8.3 Utility; 8.4 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility; 8.5 The Evolution of Empathetic Preferences; 9 The Golden Rule; 9.1 Sages down the Ages; 9.2 Hunters and Gatherers; 9.3 Mechanism Design; 9.4 An Origin for the Golden Rule?; 9.5 Enforcement; 10 Utilitarianism; 10.1 John Harsanyi; 10.2 Skyhooks?; 10.3 Summum Bonum?; 10.4 Political Legitimacy
- 10.5 Bargaining in the Original Position10.6 Social Evolution; 10.7 How Utilitarian Justice Works; 10.8 A Food-Sharing Example; 10.9 Relativity; 10.10 Why Not Utilitarianism?; 11 Egalitarianism; 11.1 Original Sin; 11.2 Equity; 11.3 Rawls' Difference Principle; 11.4 The Phantom Coin; 11.5 Fair Social Contracts; 11.6 How Egalitarian Justice Works; 11.7 Trustless Transactions; 11.8 Social Indices and the Context; 11.9 The Market; 12 Planned Decentralization; 12.1 A Third Way?; 12.2 Whiggery; 12.3 Why Decentralize?; 12.4 Why Plan?; 12.5 Designing a Social Mechanism
- 12.6 Reforming a Social Contract?12.7 Unfinished Business; 12.8 A Perfect Commonwealth?; Bibliography; Index
- Notes:
- Description based upon print version of record.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- ISBN:
- 0-19-979148-1
- 0-19-988437-4
- 0-19-803964-6
- 1-282-26735-3
- 9786612267352
- 0-19-972411-3
- OCLC:
- 319063665
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