Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships / George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mailath, George Joseph.

Contributor:

Samuelson, Larry, 1953-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory.

Economics, Mathematical.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (664 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

Contents:

Acknowledgments; Contents; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Intertemporal Incentives; 1.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma; 1.3 Oligopoly; 1.4 The Prisoner's Dilemma under Imperfect Monitoring; 1.5 The Product-Choice Game; 1.6 Discussion; 1.7 A Reader's Guide; 1.8 The Scope of the Book; Part I: Games with Perfect Monitoring; 2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring; 2.1 The Canonical Repeated Game; 2.2 The One-Shot Deviation Principle; 2.3 Automaton Representations of Strategy Profiles; 2.4 Credible Continuation Promises; 2.5 Generating Equilibria

2.6 Constructing Equilibria: Simple Strategies and Penal Codes2.7 Long-Lived and Short-Lived Players; 3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring; 3.1 Examples; 3.2 Interpreting the Folk Theorem; 3.3 The Pure-Action Folk Theorem for Two Players; 3.4 The Folk Theorem with More than Two Players; 3.5 Non-Equivalent Utilities; 3.6 Long-Lived and Short-Lived Players; 3.7 Convexifying the Equilibrium Payoff Set Without Public Correlation; 3.8 Mixed-Action Individual Rationality; 4 How Long Is Forever?; 4.1 Is the Horizon Ever Infinite?; 4.2 Uncertain Horizons; 4.3 Declining Discount Factors

4.4 Finitely Repeated Games4.5 Approximate Equilibria; 4.6 Renegotiation; 5 Variations on the Game; 5.1 Random Matching; 5.2 Relationships in Context; 5.3 Multimarket Interactions; 5.4 Repeated Extensive Forms; 5.5 Dynamic Games: Introduction; 5.6 Dynamic Games: Foundations; 5.7 Dynamic Games: Equilibrium; 6 Applications; 6.1 Price Wars; 6.2 Time Consistency; 6.3 Risk Sharing; Part II: Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring; 7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring; 7.1 The Canonical Repeated Game; 7.2 A Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Example

7.3 Decomposability and Self-Generation7.4 The Impact of Increased Precision; 7.5 The Bang-Bang Result; 7.6 An Example with Short-Lived Players; 7.7 The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Redux; 7.8 Anonymous Players; 8 Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs; 8.1 Decomposing on Half-Spaces; 8.2 The Inefficiency of Strongly Symmetric Equilibria; 8.3 Short-Lived Players; 8.4 The Prisoners' Dilemma; 9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring; 9.1 Characterizing the Limit Set of PPE Payoffs; 9.2 The Rank Conditions and a Public Monitoring Folk Theorem

9.3 Perfect Monitoring Characterizations9.4 Enforceability and Identifiability; 9.5 Games with a Product Structure; 9.6 Repeated Extensive-Form Games; 9.7 Games of Symmetric Incomplete Information; 9.8 Short Period Length; 10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring; 10.1 Sequential Equilibrium; 10.2 A Reduced-Form Example; 10.3 Two-Period Examples; 10.4 An Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; 11 Applications; 11.1 Oligopoly with Imperfect Monitoring; 11.2 Repeated Adverse Selection; 11.3 Risk Sharing; 11.4 Principal-Agent Problems

Part III: Games with Private Monitoring

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 619-628) and index.

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

9786611162856

9781281162854

128116285X

9780198041214

0198041217

9781429440271

1429440279

OCLC:

244295546