Microeconomic theory : a concise course / James Bergin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bergin, James.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Microeconomics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (379 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Microeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, and in some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion. Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumpti

Contents:

Contents; A Brief Outline of the Chapters; 1. Decision Theory; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Preferences and Optimal Choices; 1.3 Decisionmaking under Risk; 1.3.1 von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences; 1.3.2 Other preference specifications; 1.4 The State Preference Model; 1.5 Decisionmaking under Uncertainty; 1.5.1 Objections to the theory; 1.5.2 Other preference specifications; Bibliography; 2. Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 von Neumann-Morgenstern Preferences and Risk; 2.2.1 Risk aversion: some relations; 2.2.2 Risk aversion and behavior: asset choice

2.3 Risk Aversion and the State Preference Model2.4 Stochastic Dominance; 2.4.1 Stochastic dominance and distribution functions; 2.4.2 Stochastic dominance and preferences; 2.5 Equivalence of Dominance Criteria; 2.5.1 Equal means: mean preserving spreads; 2.5.2 Higher order stochastic dominance; 2.5.3 Stochastic dominance and risk aversion; 2.5.4 Likelihood ratios and hazard rates; 2.5.5 Dominance in terms of semideviations; 2.5.6 Conditional stochastic dominance and monotone likelihood ratios; Bibliography; 3. Strategic Form Games; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Strategies; 3.3 Solutions

3.3.1 Maxmin choices3.3.2 Dominant strategies; 3.3.3 Rationalizability; 3.3.4 Evolutionary stable strategies; 3.4 Nash Equilibrium; 3.5 Correlated Equilibrium; Bibliography; 4. Nash Equilibrium-Existence and Refinements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Nash Equilibrium; 4.3 Existence of Equilibrium; 4.3.1 Fixed points; 4.3.2 Equilibrium; 4.4 Perfect Equilibrium; 4.5 Proper Equilibrium; 4.6 Persistent Equilibrium; Bibliography; 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Mechanisms; 5.3 Complete and Incomplete Information Environments; 5.4 Implementation: Complete Information; 5.4.1 Direct mechanisms

5.5 Dominant Strategy Implementation5.5.1 The revelation principle: dominant strategies; 5.5.2 Strategy-proofness; 5.5.3 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; 5.5.4 Preference domain restrictions; Bibliography; 6. Implementation: Complete and Incomplete Information; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Complete Information Environments; 6.3 Strategic Form Mechanisms (Complete Information); 6.3.1 The environment; 6.3.2 Nash implementation; 6.3.3 Undominated Nash implementation; 6.3.4 Virtual implementation; 6.4 Extensive Form Mechanisms (Complete Information); 6.5 Incomplete Information Environments

6.5.1 The framework6.5.2 Incentive compatibility and participation; 6.5.3 Ex ante, interim, and ex post criteria; 6.5.4 Strategic form mechanisms (incomplete information); 6.5.5 Nash implementation; 6.6 Other Mechanisms; Bibliography; 7. Auctions I: Independent Values; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Auction Procedures; 7.2.1 First price auctions; 7.2.2 Second price auctions; 7.2.3 All-pay auctions; 7.2.4 Fixed price auctions (take it or leave it pricing); 7.2.5 The Dutch and the English auctions; 7.3 Revenue Equivalence; 7.4 Reduced Form Auctions; 7.4.1 Incentive compatibility; 7.4.2 Revenue

7.5 The Optimal Auction

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-153563-X

1-282-05290-X

9786612052903

1-4416-0874-5

OCLC:

735625080