The two selves : their metaphysical commitments and functional independence / Stanley B. Klein.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Klein, Stanley B.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Self-consciousness (Awareness).

Knowledge, Theory of.

Metaphysics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (132 p.)

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a ""thing"" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of its potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self

Contents:

Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1. Introductory Remarks About the Problem of the Self; 2. The Epistemological Self-The Self of Neural Instantiation; 3. The Ontological Self-The Self of First-Person Subjectivity; 4. The Epistemological and Ontological Selves: A Brief "Summing Up"; 5. Empirical Evidence and the Ontological and Epistemological Selves; 6. Some Final Thoughts; Notes; References; Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

1-306-22445-4

0-19-934997-5

0-19-934998-3

OCLC:

867049828