Executive remuneration and employee performance-related pay : a transatlantic perspective / Tito Boeri.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Boeri, Tito.

Series:

Fondazione Rodolfo Debendetti Reports

Fondazione Rodolfo Debendetti reports

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Executives--Salaries, etc.

Executives.

Merit pay.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (311 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The compensation packages of a growing proportion of firms include pay schemes that are linked to employee or company performance, yet little is known about the patterns of performance related pay. This book compares US and European CEOs to investigate the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies, and its resulting regulations.

Contents:

Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Boxes; List of Contributors; Introduction; Part I. The Executive Compensation Controversy: A Transatlantic Analysis; Executive Summary; Introduction; 1. The Evolution of Executive Compensation: The US Experience; 1.1 The Evolution of US CEO Pay; 1.2 The Evolution of US Disclosure Requirements; 1.3 The Evolution of US Stock Options; 1.4 The Financial Crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act; 2. The Transatlantic Pay Divide: Is Europe Catching Up?; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Executive Compensation in Europe (versus the United States)

2.3 The Transatlantic Pay Divide2.4 Equity-Based Incentives for European CEOs; 3. Banking Bonuses and the Financial Crisis; 3.1 The US Experience; 3.2 The European Experience; 3.3 How Incentive Pay Can Increase Risk (and How to Fix it); 3.4 Did Banking Bonuses Cause the Financial Crisis?; 3.5 Should Compensation in Banks be Reformed?; 4. Summary and Policy Implications; 4.1 Putting the Pay Controversies in Context; 4.2 Should Executive Pay be Regulated?; References; Comments; Part II. Paying for Performance: Incentive Pay Schemes and Employees' Financial Participation; Executive Summary

Introduction5. Forms of Incentive Pay; 5.1 Individual Performance Pay; 5.2 Group Performance Pay; 5.3 Financial Participation; 6. Performance Pay and Financial Participation; 6.1 New Comparative Evidence; 6.2 Empirical Regularities Within Countries; 6.3 Empirical Regularities Between Countries; 7. Theoretical Implications; 7.1 Heterogeneity and Selection; 7.2 Risk Aversion and Performance Measurement; 7.3 Group Incentives and Monitoring; 7.4 The Battle Against Free Riding; 7.5 The Macro Issues; 7.6 Conclusion; 8. Empirical Literature; 8.1 Individual Performance-Related Pay

8.2 Group Incentive Pay8.3 Financial Participation; 8.4 Summary; 9. New Evidence on Performance-Related Pay; 9.1 Incentive Effects of PRP in a Catering Services Company; 9.2 Decentralized Bargaining and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Metal-Engineering Industry; 9.3 Incentive Pay and Financial Participation in France; 10. Should Governments Encourage Group Incentive Pay and Financial Participation?; 10.1 Are Policy Interventions Justifiable?; 10.2 Possible Policies to Encourage Group Incentives and Financial Participation; References; Comments; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M

NO; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W

Notes:

Includes index.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on Apr. 5, 2013).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-164858-2

1-299-39731-X

OCLC:

922972039