Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan / James H. Lebovic.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lebovic, James H., author.

Series:

Bridging the gap.

Oxford scholarship online.

Bridging the gap

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

National security--United States--Decision making--Case studies.

National security.

Afghan War, 2001-2021.

Vietnam War, 1961-1975.

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

United States--Military policy--Decision making--Case studies.

United States.

United States--History, Military--Case studies.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (257 pages)

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.

Summary:

The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.

Contents:

The US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afhanistan

The Vietnam War, 1965-1973

The Iraq War, 2003-2011

The Afghanistan War, 2001-?

Long and costly wars : what can we learn?

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on print version record.

Previously issued in print: 2019.

ISBN:

0-19-093534-0

0-19-093726-2

0-19-093533-2