Formal modeling in social science / Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mershon, Carol, author.

Shvetsova, Olga (Olga Vitalievna), author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social sciences--Mathematical models.

Social sciences.

Social sciences--Methodology.

Social sciences--Research--Methodology.

Physical Description:

xvii, 238 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2019]

Contents:

1.1 Designing Formal Models p. 2

1.1.1 The Place of Formal Models in Research Design p. 2

1.1.2 Formal Models and Theoretical Replication p. 4

1.2 Models as Methodological Tools p. 6

1.3 Theory, Models, and Evidence: A First Look p. 7

1.4.1 Why Care about Models: Epistemology and Function p. 12

1.5 Map of the Book p. 16

2 Epistemology: A Path to Knowledge from Story through Narrative to Model p. 19

2.1 Formal Models in Research Design: A Closer Look p. 20

2.2 Why and When the Use of Formal Models Improves Theories p. 22

2.2.1 How the Theory Informs the Model: T → M p. 22

2.2.2 How Models Test and Build Theories (M → T', part 1) p. 24

2.2.3 Strategies for Reconciling Theory and Model (M → T', part 2) p. 29

2.2.4 Limits of Reconciliation between a Theory and a Model p. 34

2.3 The Connection between Models and Evidence (Ei → M and M → E) p. 35

2.3.1 Modeling- Life, the Universe, and Everything (Ei → M) p. 36

2.3.2 What Is a Narrative and How Is It Constructed? Ei → N or T → N? p. 38

2.3.3 Thick vs. Thin Narratives: The Art of Finding the Balance p. 40

2.3.4 Overextending the Inductive Step: The Special Case of the Fusion of Narratives and Formal Models in the Method of Analytic Narratives p. 41

2.3.5 Models to Evidence: M → E p. 42

2.4 Single Story, Multiple Narratives, Even More Models p. 45

2.5 Models in the Big Picture p. 46

3 Methodology: Strategy and Practice in Modeling for Substantive Research p. 49

3.1 The Primacy of Theory p. 49

3.1.1 The Distinctiveness of Formal Theory as a Methodology p. 50

3.1.2 The Question as Prism p. 51

3.2 The Technology of Modeling: Types of Formal Models p. 52

3.2.1 Expected Utility Maximization p. 53

3.2.2 Decision Theory p. 55

3.2.3 Social Choice Theory p. 55

3.2.4 Cooperative Game Theory p. 56

3.2.5 Noncooperative Game Theory p. 57

3.3 Knowing the Steps and Stepping in Sequence p. 58

3.4 The Generality of a Model p. 63

3.4.1 Assumptions: The Fewer the Better p. 64

3.4.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma: Illustrious and Illustrative p. 65

4 Community Effort: Rewarding or Requiring a Reward? p. 71

4.1 What Is in It for the Chief? p. 75

4.1.1 The Chief as a Traditional Officeholder p. 76

4.1.2 Model 4.1: The Chiefs Utility Function p. 78

4.1.3 A Few Testable Implications from Model 4.1 p. 81

4.2 What Is in It for the Villagers? p. 81

4.2.1 The Villagers' Responses to the Awards p. 83

4.2.2 Model 4.2: The Utility of Two Types of Villagers p. 85

4.2.3 Testable Implications from Model 4.2 p. 87

4.3 Does Turning to Awards Point to an Erosion of Traditional Identity? p. 88

4.3.1 Redefining a Contemporary Traditional Community p. 89

4.3.2 Model 4.3: Villagers' Compliance with (Redefined) Community Values p. 91

4.3.3 Testable Implications from Model 4.3 p. 93

5 Industry Regulation: Rationale and Stakeholders (with Julie Van Dusky-Allen) p. 95

5.0 Extant Knowledge as the Baseline p. 98

5.1 Negative Externalities to Agents Outside a Regulatory Regime p. 103

5.1.1 Technology Choice to Minimize Costs Is Costly for Others p. 103

5.1.2 Model 5.1: Not in Common! p. 106

5.1.3 Testable Implications from Model 5.1 p. 110

5.2 Proposing a Change in Regulatory Provisions to Best Advance a Policy Goal p. 110

5.2.1 Regulation as an Object of Design p. 111

5.2.2 Reassessing Technology Choice under Variable Monitoring Thresholds p. 114

5.2.3 Hypotheses: Instruments for Assessing Policy Experimentation p. 116

5.3 How to Regulate Use of Two Resources at Once? p. 118

5.3.1 How Hard Would a Subnational Agency Push for Regulatory Change? p. 118

5.3.2 Balancing Stakeholders' Interests p. 121

5.3.3 Testable Implications p. 126

6 Setting the Agenda to Manipulate the Outcome (with Benjamin Farrer) p. 129

6.1 All in a Day's Work: International Diplomacy on the Prime Minister's Multifold Agenda p. 132

6.2 Social Choice Agenda Setting Model p. 136

6.3 The Same Narrative Modeled as a Cooperative Game p. 146

6.4 No Testable Propositions: Outcomes of Agenda Manipulation Compared to Counterfactuals p. 152

7 Games and Uncertainty in U.S. Criminal Justice Systems (with Andrei Zhirnov) p. 155

7.1 Why Do Guards Abuse Prisoners? p. 158

7.1.1 Rationalizing Norms of Illegal Behavior within Law Enforcement p. 158

7.1.2 The Game between Guards and Prisoners p. 160

7.1.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.1 p. 165

7.2 Why Do the Deputies Obstruct the FBI Investigation? p. 167

7.2.1 Risk, Obstruction, and Monitoring p. 167

7.2.2 The Game between the Sheriff's Deputies and the Federal Agents p. 169

7.2.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.2 p. 173

7.3 What Does the Judge Hope to Accomplish beyond Punishing the Guilty? p. 175

7.3.1 Guilt, Punishment, and Precedent p. 175

7.3.2 The Game between the Sheriff's Deputies and the Judge p. 176

7.3.3 Hypotheses from Model 7.3 p. 181

8 The Rote of Modeling in How We Know What We Know p. 185

8.1 The Epistemological Place of Formal Models p. 186

8.1.1 Models Test Theory p. 186

8.1.2 Models Build Theory p. 189

8.2 Formal Models in Research Design p. 189

8.2.1 Models Enhance Hypotheses p. 190

8.2.2 Models Enable Theoretical Replication p. 191

8.2.3 Models Advance Knowledge Accumulation p. 192

8.3 Our Epistemological Claims p. 193

8.4 The Meta-Method of Formal Modeling p. 194

8.5 Broad Implications and the Agenda Looking Forward p. 195.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN:

0472074237

9780472074235

9780472054237

0472054236

OCLC:

1099532424