My Account Log in

1 option

The feeling of life itself : why consciousness is widespread but can't be computed / Christof Koch.

Van Pelt Library BF311 .K6393 2019
Loading location information...

Available This item is available for access.

Log in to request item
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Koch, Christof, 1956- author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Consciousness.
Self.
Artificial intelligence.
Physical Description:
xviii, 257 pages ; 24 cm
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Massachusetts : MIT Press, [2019]
Summary:
An argument that consciousness, more widespread than previously assumed, is the feeling of being alive, not a type of computation or a clever hack. A thought-provoking argument that consciousness-more widespread than previously assumed-is the feeling of being alive, not a type of computation or a clever hack In The Feeling of Life Itself, Christof Koch offers a straightforward definition of consciousness as any subjective experience, from the most mundane to the most exalted-the feeling of being alive.Psychologists study which cognitive operations underpin a given conscious perception. Neuroscientists track the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain, the organ of the mind. But why the brain and not, say, the liver? How can the brain-three pounds of highly excitable matter, a piece of furniture in the universe, subject to the same laws of physics as any other piece-give rise to subjective experience? Koch argues that what is needed to answer these questions is a quantitative theory that starts with experience and proceeds to the brain. In The Feeling of Life Itself, Koch outlines such a theory, based on integrated information. Koch describes how the theory explains many facts about the neurology of consciousness and how it has been used to build a clinically useful consciousness meter. The theory predicts that many, and perhaps all, animals experience the sights and sounds of life; consciousness is much more widespread than conventionally assumed. Contrary to received wisdom, however, Koch argues that programmable computers will not have consciousness. Even a perfect software model of the brain is not conscious. Its simulation is fake consciousness. Consciousness is not a special type of computation-it is not a clever hack. Consciousness is about being.
Contents:
1 What Is Consciousness? p. 1
2 Who Is Conscious? p. 11
3 Animal Consciousness p. 25
4 Consciousness and the Rest p. 33
5 Consciousness and the Brain p. 39
6 Tracking the Footprints of Consciousness p. 53
7 Why We Need a Theory of Consciousness p. 71
8 Of Wholes p. 79
9 Tools to Measure Consciousness p. 93
10 The Über-Mind and Pure Consciousness p. 105
11 Does Consciousness Have a Function? p. 119
12 Consciousness and Computationalism p. 129
13 Why Computers Can't Experience p. 141
14 Is Consciousness Everywhere? p. 155.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9780262042819
0262042819
OCLC:
1105737819

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account