The U.S. Army and the battle for Baghdad : lessons learned - and still to be learned / David E. Johnson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Brenna Allen, Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael Schwille, Jerry M. Sollinger, Sean M. Zeigler.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950-2022.

Contributor:

Schaefer, Agnes Gereben.

Allen, Brenna.

Cohen, Raphael S.

Gentile, Gian.

Hoobler, James.

Schwille, Michael.

Sollinger, Jerry M.

Zeigler, Sean.

Arroyo Center. Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program.

Rand Corporation.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. Army--History--Iraq War, 2003-2011.

United States.

United States. Army--Drill and tactics.

United States. Army.

Iraq War, 2003-2011--Campaigns--Iraq--Baghdad.

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

History.

Physical Description:

xxvi, 292 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm

Place of Publication:

Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND, [2019]

Summary:

The U.S. Army's many adaptations during the Iraq War were remarkable, particularly in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel, and leader development and education. The Army has already institutionalized some of those adaptations; however, other important lessons have not yet been institutionalized. In an effort to help the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army retain institutional knowledge and capabilities and fully prepare leaders for future conflicts, RAND researchers recount the Army's efforts in the Iraq War, especially in Baghdad, and offer lessons learned and recommendations. For example, if the United States engages in a similar conflict in the future, the Army should prepare to prevent insurgencies; provide robust division, corps, and theater headquarters; and consider making advisement a necessary assignment for career advancement. Instability and insurgency are part of the future, and if history is any guide, the United States will look to the Army to deal with these challenges. Thus, the ultimate goal of this report is to help the Army continue to institutionalize the lessons from the Iraq War and the Battle for Baghdad to minimize the amount of adaptation the Army will have to undergo when it is called to serve in similar circumstances.

Contents:

Preface

Figures and tables

Summary

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Prewar planning

Chapter Three: Occupation

Chapter Four: The Casey period

Chapter Five: The surge

Chapter Six: Withdrawal

Chapter Seven: Overarching lessons for the U.S. Army

Appendix: Timeline of major events in the battle for Baghdad

References.

Notes:

"Prepared for the United States Army."

"RAND Arroyo Center."

Title from PDF document (viewed May 24, 2019).

Includes bibliographical references (pages 269-292).

Supersedes RAND/PR-2355-A.

ISBN:

9780833096012

083309601X

OCLC:

1106169885