Normative externalism / Brian Weatherson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Weatherson, Brian, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Normativity (Ethics).

Externalism (Philosophy of mind).

Agent (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xiii, 245 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.

Summary:

Brian Weatherson argues that it is not important for people to live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: they should do the right thing and they should believe rationally. So moral uncertainty should not be treated like factual uncertainty.

Contents:

1.1 To Thine Own Self Be True p. 1

1.2 Four Questions p. 2

1.3 Normative Externalism Defined p. 8

1.4 Guidance p. 9

1.5 Symmetry p. 10

1.6 Regress p. 13

1.7 Two Recent Debates p. 17

1.8 Elizabeth and Descartes p. 18

1.9 Why Call This Externalism? p. 20

1.10 Plan of Book p. 22

2 All About Internalism p. 27

2.1 Some Distinctions p. 27

2.2 Two Ways of Maximizing Expected Goodness p. 31

2.3 Varieties of Internalism p. 32

2.4 An Initial Constraint p. 34

2.5 Motivation One: Guidance p. 36

2.6 Motivation Two: Recklessness p. 37

2.7 Motivation Three: Symmetry p. 39

3 Against Symmetry p. 41

3.1 Guilt and Shame p. 41

3.2 Jackson Cases p. 42

3.4 Welfare and Motivation p. 48

3.5 Motivation, Virtues, and Vices p. 50

3.6 The Weak Motivation Principle (WMP) p. 52

3.7 The Strong Motivation Principle (SMP) p. 57

3.8 Motivation Through Thick and Thin p. 61

3.9 Moller's Example p. 65

4 A Dilemma for Internalism p. 68

4.1 Six Forms of Internalism p. 68

4.2 Two Difficult Cases p. 70

4.3 Inadvertent Virtue and Misguided Conscience p. 72

4.4 Ethics and Epistemology p. 74

4.5 Rationality and Symmetry p. 78

5 Blame and Moral Ignorance p. 84

5.1 Does Moral Ignorance Excuse? p. 84

5.2 Why Believe MIE? p. 86

5.3 Chapter Plan p. 87

5.4 Blame and Desire p. 88

5.5 Blame, Agents, and Time p. 90

5.6 Acting in Ignorance Is No Excuse p. 91

5.7 Against Counterfactual Interpretations of Acting from Ignorance p. 92

5.8 Against Motivational Interpretations of Acting from Ignorance p. 94

5.9 Adopting a Decision Procedure and Acting on It p. 97

5.10 Calhoun on Blame and Blameworthiness p. 98

5.11 Moral Mistakes and Moral Strangers p. 103

5.12 Two Approaches to Blame p. 106

6 Double Standards p. 109

6.1 Hypocrites p. 109

6.2 Value Comparisons p. 112

6.3 The Externalist's Commitments p. 114

Part II Epistemology

7 Level-Crossing Principles p. 119

7.1 First-Order and Second-Order Epistemology p. 119

7.2 Change Evidentialism p. 120

7.3 Motivations for Level-Crossing p. 121

7.4 The Plan for the Rest of the Book p. 123

7.5 Evidence, Rationality, and Wisdom p. 124

7.6 Evidence, Thought, and Mathematics p. 125

8 Higher-Order Evidence p. 130

8.1 Varieties of Higher-Order Examples p. 130

8.2 Diagnoses and Alternatives p. 133

8.3 Tiredness and Abduction p. 135

8.4 Explaining All Four Cases p. 138

8.5 Against Bracketing p. 143

9 Circles, Epistemic and Benign p. 146

9.1 Normative Externalism and Circularity p. 146

9.2 Inference, Implication, and Transmission p. 148

9.3 Liberalism, Defeaters, and Circles p. 150

9.4 Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Normative Externalism p. 156

9.5 Easy Knowledge p. 157

9.6 What's Wrong with Easy Knowledge? p. 160

9.7 Coda: Testing p. 165

10 Akrasia p. 170

10.1 The Possibility of Akrasia p. 171

10.2 Three Level-Crossing Principles p. 172

10.3 Why Not Be Akratic? p. 174

10.4 Self-Awareness and Rational Reflection p. 178

10.5 Akrasia and Odd Statements p. 181

10.6 Desire as Belief (Reprise) p. 182

11 Screening and Regresses p. 186

11.1 Screening p. 186

11.2 The Counting Problem p. 187

11.3 JSE in Epistemology p. 189

11.4 JSE and Higher-Order Evidence p. 192

11.5 The Regress Objection p. 193

11.6 Laundering p. 197

11.7 Agents, States, and Actions p. 199

12 Disagreement p. 203

12.1 Introducing the Issues p. 203

12.2 Two Concepts of Peerhood p. 205

12.3 Evidence, Public and Private p. 207

12.4 Independence and Conciliationism p. 209

12.5 Circularity and Conciliationism p. 211

12.6 Six Examples p. 212

12.7 Equal Weight and the Cases p. 214

12.8 The Evidence Aggregation Approach p. 220.

Notes:

Previously issued in print: 2019.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-257689-5

0-19-187602-X

0-19-257688-7