How to count animals, more or less / Shelly Kagan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kagan, Shelly, author.

Series:

Uehiro series in practical ethics.

Uehiro series in practical ethics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Animals (Philosophy).

Animal welfare.

Human-animal relationships--Moral and ethical aspects.

Human-animal relationships.

Hierarchies.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (x, 309 pages) : illustrations

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.

Summary:

Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In 'How to Count Animals,' more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

Contents:

1 Standing p. 6

1.1 Standing and Status p. 6

1.2 Sentience p. 10

1.3 Agency p. 16

1.4 Agency without Sentience p. 23

1.5 Welfare and Standing p. 30

2 Unitarianism p. 37

2.1 Unitarianism p. 37

2.2 The Greater Harm p. 42

2.3 Comparing Lives p. 45

2.4 Hierarchy p. 52

3 The Argument from Distribution p. 58

3.1 Distributive Principles p. 58

3.2 The Argument from Distribution p. 62

3.3 Replies p. 69

4 Hierarchy and the Value of Outcomes p. 79

4.1 Hierarchy in Distribution p. 79

4.2 Problems for Priority p. 87

4.3 Well-Being p. 96

4.4 Dismissing the View p. 101

4.5 The Status Adjusted Value of Well-Being p. 108

5 Status p. 112

5.1 Grounds of Status p. 112

5.2 Individualism p. 117

5.3 Which Capacities? p. 121

5.4 Potential p. 130

5.5 Modal Status p. 137

6 Worries about Hierarchy p. 146

6.1 Elitism p. 146

6.2 Superior Beings p. 149

6.3 Marginal Cases p. 156

6.4 Normal Variation p. 164

7 Deontology p. 170

7.1 Consequentialism and Deontology p. 170

7.2 Absolutist Deontology p. 174

7.3 Moderate Deontology p. 179

7.4 Some Calculations p. 184

8 Restricted Deontology p. 191

8.1 Excluding Animals from Deontology p. 191

8.2 Autonomy p. 194

8.3 Resisting the Argument p. 201

8.4 Dichotomous Properties p. 207

9 Hierarchical Deontology p. 215

9.1 Weaker Rights p. 215

9.2 Thresholds p. 219

9.3 Meeting the Threshold p. 231

9.4 Other Principles p. 238

10 Defense p. 248

10.1 The Right to Self-Defense p. 248

10.2 Defending Animals p. 252

10.3 Defending Against Animals p. 258

10.4 Defending Animals Against Animals p. 267

10.5 More on Proportionality p. 274

11 Limited Hierarchy p. 279

11.1 A Suitable Step Function p. 279

11.2 Practical Realism p. 284

11.3 The View that Emerges p. 292

11.4 Pretense p. 299

11.5 How to Count Animals p. 302.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

This edition previously issued in print: 2019.

ISBN:

0-19-256518-4

0-19-186817-5

0-19-256517-6