The Oxford handbook of public choice. Volume 1 / edited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Congleton, Roger D., editor.

Grofman, Bernard, editor.

Voigt, Stefan, editor.

Series:

Oxford handbooks online

Oxford handbooks in economics and finance.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social choice.

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Other Title:

Public choice

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2019.

System Details:

data file

Summary:

The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 1 covers rational choice models of elections, interest groups, rent seeking, and public choice contributions to normative political economy. It begins with introductory chapters on rational choice politics, the founding of public choice, and the evaluation and selection of constitutions.

Contents:

Rational Choice and Politics / Roger D. Congleton

Spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions / James F. Adams

Spatial social choice / Norman Schofield

Economic voting / Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Mary Stegmaier

Valence politics / Haldun Evrenk

The Study of Strategic Voting / André Blais, Arianna Degan

Turnout: Why do voters vote? / Serguei Kaniovski

Expressive voting / Alan Hamlin, Colin Jennings

Altruism and political participation / Richard Jankowski

Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout / Carole Jean Uhlaner

Information cues and rational ignorance / Shaun Bowler, Stephen P. Nicholson

Choosing among Governments / Alan Hamlin

Campaign Finance / Thomas Stratmann

Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter? / Gilles Serra

Logrolling and coalitions / Anthony J. McGann

Collective action / Jac C. Heckelman

Rent Seeking: The resource cost of influence / Arye L. Hillman, Ngo Van Long

The structure of contests and the extent of dissipation / Karl Wärneryd

The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction / Roger D. Congleton

Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs / Ignacio del Rosal

'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest Group / Patrick Dunleavy

Interest groups and regulatory capture / William F. Shughart II, Diana W. Thomas

Public Choice: Early Contributions / Dennis C. Mueller

Corruption / Toke Aidt

The Political Economy of Trust / Christian Bjørnskov

Contested Political Persuasion / Stergios Skaperdas, Samarth Vaidya

Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change / Michel Regenwetter, Yung-Fong Hsu

Leadership as Persuasion / Benjamin E. Hermalin

Public choice and social democracy / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Fairness concepts / Christian Klamler

Social contract vs. Invisible hand: Agreeing to solve solcial dilemmas / Viktor J. Vanberg

Utilitarianism as a criterion for state action / Nicolaus Tideman, Florenz Plassmann

From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's Theorem / Donald G. Saari

Public Choice and Happiness / Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer

Kantianism and Political Institutions / Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt

Public Choice and Libertarianism / Peter Boettke, Ennio E. Piano

Supreme Values, Conflict, and Governance / Peter Bernholz

Fair Division in Dispute Resolution / Steven J. Brams

Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries / Steven J. Brams

Manipulation / Charles Plott

Institution-induced stability / Kenneth A. Shepsle

Voting Power / Stefan Napel

Aggregation of information by binary voting rules / Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Paroush

Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory / Bernard Grofman

Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications / Bernard Grofman.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on February 5, 2019).

Other Format:

Print version :

ISBN:

9780190469764

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.