2 options
Medical Savings Accounts and the Dynamics of Adverse Selection.
- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Health insurance.
- Mathematical models.
- Statistics.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (32 pages) : digital, PDF file
- monochrome
- Place of Publication:
- [Place of publication not identified] : [publisher not identified], 1996.
- System Details:
- System requirements: PDF reader software.
- text file
- Summary:
- Examines feasibility of increasing health insurance plan deductibles to reduce premiums and redirect the resulting savings to Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). Conducts simulations to model the transfer of people with high and low health expenses between a traditional health insurance plan and a high deductible plan with an MSA. Discusses effect of adverse selection, in which plans attract an unusually high number of high-risk enrollees. Includes tables and charts.
- Notes:
- CRS Report.
- Record is based on bibliographic data in ProQuest U.S. Congressional Research Digital Collection (last viewed July 2010). Reuse except for individual research requires license from ProQuest, LLC.
- Other Format:
- Microfiche version: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Medical Savings Accounts and the Dynamics of Adverse Selection
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.