What are fiscal rules for? A critical analysis of the Argentine experience / Miguel Braun and Nicolás Gadano.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Braun, Miguel, author.

Contributor:

Gadano, Nicolás.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Economic and Social Development.

Local Subjects:

Economic and Social Development.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (13 pages)

Contained In:

CEPAL Review Vol. 2007, no. 91, p. 53-65 2007:91<53 16840348

Place of Publication:

New York : United Nations, 2007.

System Details:

data file

Summary:

This article undertakes a critical examination of the usefulness of fiscal responsibility laws in situations of institutional weakness. It analyses the case of Argentina, where prodigal use of fiscal rules (two different laws in just five years) contrasts with their limited effectiveness for fiscal policy sustainability and transparency, and it confirms that in situations of institutional weakness a fiscal responsibility law is unlikely to constrain government decision-making to the extent necessary to correct the behaviour of the public finances. The case of Argentina thus provides a warning for supporters of fiscal rules. When fiscal credibility is low and institutions weak, not only may such rules be fiscally ineffective, but non-enforcement may weaken yet further the fragile institutional context which made them so ineffective to begin with.

Notes:

Title from title screen (viewed May 1, 2017).

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.