Policy Pre-Commitment and Institutional Design : A Synthetic Indicator Applied to Currency Boards / Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson = Engagement statutaire et définition institutionnelle : Un indicateur synthétique appliqué aux cas des caisses d'émission / Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Camilleri Gilson, Marie-Thérèse, author.

Contributor:

SourceOECD (Online service)

Series:

OECD Economics Department Working Papers 18151973 ; no.330.

OECD Economics Department Working Papers 18151973 ; no.330

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Economics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (68 pages).

Other Title:

Engagement statutaire et définition institutionnelle Un indicateur synthétique appliqué aux cas des caisses d'émission

Place of Publication:

Paris : OECD Publishing, 2002.

System Details:

text file

Summary:

Currency boards have been portrayed as an extreme way of creating currency quality and improving monetary policy credibility in emerging market economies. Yet the link between currency board operations and credibility is far from obvious. Indeed, under the heading of currency boards, there is in fact a number of significantly diverse institutional arrangements. Furthermore, currency boards can only be viewed as part of a wider policy framework encompassing fiscal sustainability and flexibility in the real economy. Along these lines, this paper describes as precisely as possible what constitutes, in theory, a currency board. It highlights the specificities of money multiplier and balance sheet issues in currency board frameworks. The paper offers an in-depth review of the actual institutional arrangements underlying existing currency boards in Eastern Europe and Asia (as well as that of Argentina until 2001) and derives a synthetic indicator of institutional pre-commitment. The ...

Notes:

Title from title screen (viewed May 1, 2017).

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.