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Essays in political economy and international public finance / Áron Kiss.

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Format:
Book
Thesis/Dissertation
Author/Creator:
Kiss, Áron.
Series:
Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften, 0170-8252 ; Bd. 119
FINANZWISSENSCHAFTLICHE SCHRIFTEN Essays in Political Economy and International Public Finance
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Game theory.
Economics--Mathematical models.
Economics.
International finance.
Finance, Public.
International finance--Econometric models.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (126 p.)
Place of Publication:
Frankfurt am Main ; New York : Peter Lang, 2009.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
The essays of the book are contributions to the game theoretic analysis of the State. Two of the essays develop further the analysis of political accountability. Political accountability is the study of how the behavior of politicians is shaped by the prospect of reelections. The essays in this book enrich this field by introducing aspects of coalition government and ideology. A third essay focuses on strategic behavior by states in repeated tax competition. The contribution of this essay is the reevaluation of a lower bound to admissible taxrates as a policy instrument to contain tax competition.
Contents:
Contents; 1 Introduction 5; 1.1 Game-theoretic analysis of the state 6; 1.2 The study of political accountability 8; 1.2.1 History and previous results 8; 1.2.2 Contribution of the thesis 17; 1.3 The study of fiscal competition 23; 1.3.1 History and previous results 24; 1.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 32; 2 Coalitions and political accountability 35; 2.1 Motivation 35; 2.2 Related literature 39; 2.3 Accountability of electoral blocs 42; 2.4 Accountability of the unity government 45; 2.5 Conclusion 55; 2.6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 2 57; 3 Divisive politics and accountability 65
3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Ph. D. Freie Universität zu Berlin 2009
Includes bibliographical references.
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
Description based on print version record; resource not viewed.
ISBN:
1-299-43264-6
3-653-00308-3
OCLC:
818881103
Access Restriction:
Open access Unrestricted online access

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