Bringing controlling shareholders to court : standard-based strategies and controlling shareholder opportunism / Chunyan Fan.

Format:

Book

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Fan, Chunyan, author.

Series:

CRBS-dissertatiereeks Bringing controlling shareholders to court

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Corporate governance--United States.

Corporate governance.

Corporate governance--Great Britain.

Corporate governance--China.

Stockholders--Legal status, laws, etc--United States.

Stockholders.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (275 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Hague, Netherlands : Eleven International Publishing, 2013.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Controlling shareholders have largely unbalanced power in the governance structure of corporations, which leaves the minority shareholders vulnerable to being exploited. One way to deal with the problem is to allow minority shareholders to sue a controlling shareholder when they think they have been treated unfairly by the said controlling shareholder, and the challenged conduct will be reviewed by court under certain standard pre-set by law. Legal practitioners and economists consider this kind of solution a standard-based strategy. This book discusses how to use these standard-based strategi

Contents:

Cover; Title Page; Acknowledgement; Chapter I Introduction; 1.1 Controlling Shareholder Opportunism; 1.2 Standard-Based Strategies; 1.3 The Research Issue and Sub-Issues; 1.4 Individual Jurisdiction Study; 1.5 Structure of the Book; Chapter II Shareholder Dynamics and Agency Problem; 2.1 Shareholders' Control Rights; 2.1.1 Shareholder as Risk Capital Provider; 2.1.2 Legal Nature of the Company; 2.1.3 Shareholder Control; 2.1.3.1 Matters Subject to Shareholder Voting; 2.1.3.2 Implications of Shareholder Voting Rights; 2.1.4 Conflict of Interests within Shareholder Group

2.2 The Agency Theory2.2.1 Agency Relationship; 2.2.2 Agency Problem; 2.2.2.1 An Utility Maximizing Agent; 2.2.2.2 Agency Cost; 2.2.3 The Strategies: An Overview; 2.3 Dealing with the Controlling v. Minority shareholdersConflict; 2.3.1 Affiliation Rights; 2.3.2 Reward Strategy; 2.3.3 Decision Rights Strategies; 2.3.4 Rules and Standards; Chapter III Fiduciary Duty: The Standard-based Strategy; 3.1 Director's Fiduciary Duty; 3.1.1 The Fiduciary Relationship; 3.1.2 Director as a Fiduciary; 3.1.3 The Standard-Based Strategy in Evolution: Director-RelatedTransaction Regulation as an Example

3.2 Enforcing Fiduciary Duty3.2.1 Courts and Enforcing Directors' Duties; 3.2.1.1Duty of Loyalty and the Entire Fairness StandardThe duty of loyalty requires a director to serve the company's interest; 3.2.1.2 Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule; 3.2.1.3 To Review or Not to Review?; 3.2.2 Derivative Action; 3.3 Reflecting on the Strategy; Chapter IV The United States; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Controlling Shareholders and Their Role as Fiduciaries; 4.2.1 Definition of "Controlling Shareholder"; 4.2.1.1 De jure Controlling Shareholder; 4.2.1.2 De facto Controlling Shareholder

4.2.1.2.1 Plaintiff's Burden of Proof4.2.1.2.2 Establishing Working Control; 4.2.2 Controlling Shareholders as Fiduciaries; 4.3 The Standard of Entire Fairness: Fair Price and Fair Dealing; 4.3.1 Fair Price; 4.3.2 Fair Dealing; 4.3.2.1 Arm's Length Bargain; 4.3.2.2 Duty of Full Disclosure; 4.3.2.2.1 "Completeness" in the Disclosure of Material Information; 4.3.2.2.2 Limitation as to Materiality: Examples from Rosenblatt and Lynch II; 4.3.2.2.3 "Privileged Information" in an Arm's Length Bargain?; 4.3.2.3 Fair Dealing and the Burden of Proof in Judicial Review

4.3.3 Entire Fairness: A Non-bifurcated Test4.3.4 Substantive vs. Procedural Fairness: Some Reflection; 4.3.4.1 Rosenblatt; 4.3.4.2 Procedure as Safeguard; 4.4 Applicability of the Entire Fairness Review; 4.4.1 Introduction; 4.4.2 The Sinclair Advantage/Disadvantage Test; 4.4.2.1 The Case and the Test; 4.4.2.2 Applying the Test in Sinclair; 4.4.3 Weinberger and other Post-Sinclair Cases; 4.4.4 Sinclair Revisited; 4.4.5 Judicial Review of Transactions Bargained at Arm's Length orApproved by Minority Shareholders; 4.4.5.1 A Safe Harbor under the Entire Fairness Review?

4.4.5.2 Double-Checking the Controlling Power: Over-regulation or Not?

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed April 14, 2014).

Ph. D. University of Gronigen 2013.

ISBN:

94-6094-935-5

OCLC:

876623946