Philosophy of mind : a comprehensive introduction / William Jaworski.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Jaworski, William, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy of mind.

Mind and body.

Materialism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (423 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

West Sussex, England : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Philosophy of Mind introduces readers to one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy by discussing mind-body problems and the various solutions to them. It provides a detailed yet balanced overview of the entire field that enables readers to jump immediately into current debates. Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates

Contents:

Intro

Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction

Contents

Preface

Chapter 1: Mind-Body Theories and Mind-Body Problems

Overview

1.1 Mind and Brain

1.2 Mind-Body Theories

1.3 Mind-Body Problems

1.4 The Problem of Psychophysical Emergence

1.5 The Problem of Other Minds

1.6 The Problem of Mental Causation

Further Reading

Chapter 2: The Mental-Physical Distinction

2.1 Mental versus Physical

2.2 Physical Phenomena

2.3 First-Person Authority and Subjectivity

2.4 Qualia and Phenomenal Consciousness

2.5 Intentionality, Mental Representation, and Propositional Attitudes

2.6 Rationality

Chapter 3: Substance Dualism

3.1 Substance Dualism: Its Claims and Motivations

3.2 The Argument For Substance Dualism

3.3 Objections to the Argument for Substance Dualism

3.4 Substance Dualism and the Problem of Other Minds

3.5 The Problem of Interaction

3.6 Noninteractionist Views: Parallelism and Occasionalism

3.7 The Problem of Explanatory Impotence

3.8 Substance Dualism in Perspective

Chapter 4: The Physicalist Worldview

4.1 What Physicalism Claims

4.2 Varieties of Physicalism: Eliminative, Reductive, and Nonreductive

4.3 Implications of Physicalist Theories

4.4 Motivations For Physicalism

4.5 The Argument For Physicalism: Past Scientific Success

4.6 Hempel's Dilemma

4.7 The Knowledge Argument

4.8 Absent and Inverted Qualia

4.9 Representational, Higher-Order, and Sensorimotor Theories of Consciousness

Chapter 5: Reductive Physicalism

5.1 Behaviorism

5.2 Arguments For and Against Behaviorism

5.3 The Theory Model of Psychological Discourse

5.4 The Psychophysical Identity Theory.

5.5 Smart's Argument For the Identity Theory: Ockham's Razor

5.6 Lewis's Argument For the Identity Theory

5.7 Reductivism

5.8 The Multilevel Worldview

Chapter 6: Nonreductive Physicalism

6.1 The Multiple-Realizability Argument

6.2 Reductivist Responses to the Multiple-Realizability Argument

6.3 Functionalism

6.4 Higher-Order Properties

6.5 Functionalism versus the Identity Theory

6.6 Functionalism and the Nonreductivist Consensus: Realization Physicalism

6.7 Troubles with Functionalism: Liberalism and Qualia

6.8 The Chinese Room

6.9 The Embodied Mind Objection to Functionalism

6.10 Kim's Trilemma

6.11 Supervenience Physicalism

6.12 The Exclusion Argument

6.13 Nonreductive Physicalism in Perspective

Chapter 7: Eliminative Physicalism, Instrumentalism, and Anomalous Monism

7.1 The Argument For Eliminativism

7.2 The Argument Against Eliminativism

7.3 Instrumentalism

7.4 Arguments For and Against Instrumentalism

7.5 Anomalous Monism

7.6 The Argument For Anomalous Monism

7.7 Arguments Against Anomalous Monism

Chapter 8: Dual-Attribute Theory

8.1 Dual-Attribute Theory versus Physicalism and Substance Dualism

8.2 Nonorganismic Dual-Attribute Theories

8.3 Epiphenomenalism

8.4 The Argument For Epiphenomenalism

8.5 Do Qualia Exist?

8.6 Dennett's Argument Against Qualia

8.7 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

8.8 Arguments Against Epiphenomenalism

8.9 Explaining Emergence: Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, Psychophysical Laws and Structure

8.10 Emergentism

8.11 Arguments For and Against Emergentism

8.12 Dual-Attribute Theory in Perspective

Chapter 9: Idealism, Neutral Monism, and Mind-Body Pessimism

Overview.

9.1 Varieties of Idealism

9.2 The Motivation and Argument For Ontological Idealism

9.3 Arguments Against Idealism

9.4 Neutral Monism

9.5 The Arguments For and Against Neutral Monism

9.6 Mind-Body Pessimism

Chapter 10: The Hylomorphic Worldview

10.1 What Is Hylomorphism?

10.2 The Hylomorphic Worldview

10.3 Organic Composition and Functional Analysis

10.4 The Concept of Organization

10.5 Hylomorphism and the Multilevel Worldview

10.6 Hylomorphism versus Physicalism and Classic Emergentism

10.7 Causal Pluralism

10.8 The Argument For Hylomorphism

Chapter 11: A Hylomorphic Theory of Mind

11.1 Patterns of Social and Environmental Interaction

11.2 Rejecting Inner Minds

11.3 Externalism

11.4 Inner Experiences versus Sensorimotor Exploration

11.5 Disjunctivism

11.6 Direct Access, Pattern Recognition, and the Problem of Other Minds

11.7 Psychological Language: Pattern Expression versus the Theory Model

11.8 Hylomorphism versus Behaviorism

11.9 Embodiment

11.10 Hylomorphism and the Mental-Physical Dichotomy

11.11 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Mental Causation

11.12 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Psychophysical Emergence

11.13 Arguments For and Against a Hylomorphic Theory of Mind

Glossary

References

Acknowledgments

Index.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9786613408648

9781444397581

1444397583

9781283408646

1283408643

9781444397574

1444397575

9781444333671

1444333674

OCLC:

727648283