Austin's way with skepticism : an essay on philosophical method / Mark Kaplan.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kaplan, Mark, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Austin, J. L. (John Langshaw), 1911-1960--Criticism and interpretation.

Austin, J. L.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 179 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Essay on philosophical method

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. Austin's Critical Method

I. Skeptical Argument

II. Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument

III. Austin's Way with the Argument

IV. Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided

V. Austin Misread

VI. Austin's Actual Brief

VII. Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals

VIII. "Snag of Divergent Usage"

IX. Problem of Pragmatics

X. Appeal to Philosophical Detachment

XI. Appeal to Intuitions

XII. Two Kinds of Freedom to Theorize

XIII. Work Left to Do

2. Austin as Theorist

I. Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher

II. Austin on the Nature of Knowledge

III. If You Know, You Can t Be Wrong

IV. Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge

V. Special Reasons

VI. Charge of Over-Intellectualization

VII. Missing "in Virtue" Account

VIII. Argument from Ignorance

3. Philosophical Detachment Revisited

I. Looking for a Route between the Horns

II. Plane-Spotters

III. Understanding Human Knowledge in General

IV. Nature of Experience

V. Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a Subject

VI. Tug of the Dream Argument

VII. Pragmatics Revisited

VIII. More Ecumenical Attempt

IX. Challenge that Remains

4. How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface

I. Requirement of Deductive Cogency

II. Confidence Threshold Requirement

III. Why the Threshold Requirement Can t Be Correct, Part I

IV. Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II

V. Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved

VI. Preface: Saying It's All True

VII. Preface: A Matter of Modesty

VIII. Preface: Saying the Improbable

IX. Worry about Downstream Consequences

X. Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I

XI. Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II

XII. Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility

5. How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge

I. Is it Important to Decide What You Know?

II. Knowledge and Evidence

III. Justified Belief and Evidence

IV. Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence

V. Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence

VI. Methodological Import of Gettier's Case

VII. Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier's

VIII. Moral about Experimental Epistemology

IX. Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis

6. Epistemology Austin's Way.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

This edition previously issued in print: 2018.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0-19-255832-3

0-19-186353-X

0-19-255831-5