Inner speech : new voices / edited by Peter Langland-Hassan, Agustin Vicente.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Langland-Hassan, Peter, editor.

Vicente, Agustín, 1970- editor.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Identity (Psychology).

Self-talk.

Self.

Autosuggestion.

Medical Subjects:

Autosuggestion.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (viii, 336 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

New voices

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

'Inner Speech' focuses on a familiar and yet mysterious element of our daily lives. In light of renewed interest in the general connections between thought, language, and consciousness, this anthology develops a number of important new theories about internal voices and raises questions about their nature and cognitive functions.

Contents:

Cover

Inner Speech: New Voices

Copyright

Acknowledgments

Contents

List of Figures

List of Contributors

Introduction

I.1 What Are the Proper Parts of Inner Speech, and How Do They Relate?

I.1.1 What is the relation of inner speech's components to each other?

I.2 Is Inner Speech the Expression of Thought, or Thought Itself?

I.3 In What Ways Does Inner Speech Facilitate Self-Knowledge ?

I.4 What Role Can Inner Speech Play in Explanations of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and "Inserted Thoughts"?

I.5 Vygotsky's Complicated Legacy

I.5.1 Inner speech for self-regulation

I.5.2 Inner speech as internalization of conversations

I.5.3 Inner speech as condensed and idiosyncratic

I.6 Conclusion

References

Part I: The Nature of Inner Speech

1: The Causes and Contents of Inner Speech

1.1 Causes

1.1.1 Auditory imagination

1.1.2 Mental rehearsal

1.1.3 Inner speech selection

1.2 Contents

1.2.1 Outer speech

1.2.2 Inner speech: comprehension

1.2.3 Inner speech: content

1.2.4 Why so reliable?

1.2.5 Why no uncertainty?

1.3 Conclusion

2: Inner Speech as the Internalization of Outer Speech

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Inner speech versus auditory imagery

2.2.1 The misleading identification

2.2.2 Does the analogy hold?

2.2.3 Auditory imagery as the perception of inner speech

2.2.4 Auditory imagery that represents inner speech versus auditory imagery that does not

2.2.5 Consciousness via the auditory imagery of inner speech

2.2.6 Some alternative accounts of the relation

2.3 Inner Speech as Internalized Conversation

2.3.1 Some unpersuasive arguments

2.3.2 The problem with Mentalese

2.3.3 Simple conversation

2.3.4 Conversation internalized

2.3.5 The nonlinguistic cognitive foundation

Acknowledgments.

References

3: From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Why Inner Speech Must Have an Auditory-Phonological Component

3.2.1 From phenomenology to essence

3.3 Some Objections Considered

3.3.1 Objection: I usually speak English

that's why my inner speech always seems to be in English

3.3.2 Objection: My intentions reveal to me the language to which my inner speech is keyed

3.3.3 Objection: Inner speech could have a phonological component without being auditory

3.3.4 Objection: Motor imagery allows us to judge the language to which our inner speech is keyed

3.4 Inserted Thoughts, and the Language in Which They Occur

3.4.1 AVHs, inserted thoughts, and patient reports

3.4.2 Sensorimotor accounts of agency

3.4.3 A proposal for new diagnostic questions

4: Inner Speech and Mental Imagery: A Neuroscientific Perspective

4.1 Introduction

4.2 A Brief History of Neuroscientific Investigation of Inner Speech

4.3 Imaging Studies of Inner Speech

4.4 Studies of Inner Speech in Aphasia

4.5 The Neuroscience of Mental Imagery

4.6 Visual Imagery

4.7 Motor Imagery

4.8 Principles of Imagery

Bibliography

5: A Cognitive Neuroscience View of Inner Language: To Predict and to Hear, See, Feel

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Abstract-Concrete Dimension of Inner Language

5.2.1 Arguments for the abstractness and amodality of inner language

5.2.2 Arguments for the concreteness and multimodality of inner language

5.2.2.1 PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES

5.2.2.2 CEREBRAL CORRELATES

5.2.2.3 ARTICULATORY SPECIFICATION

5.2.2.4 GESTURAL REPRESENTATION IN COVERT SIGN LANGUAGE

5.2.3 Coexistence of abstract-amodal and concrete-multimodal forms

5.3 The Sensory-Motor Dimension of Inner Language.

5.3.1 Arguments for a motor or enactive nature

5.3.2 Arguments for a sensory nature

5.4 Integrating the Sensory-Motor Nature of Inner Language into the "Predictive Control" Account

5.5 A Cerebral Landscape

5.6 Conclusion

Acknowledgements

6: Inner Speaking as Pristine Inner Experience

6.1 Characteristics of an Adequate Method

6.2 Descriptive Experience Sampling

6.3 Reflections on the Current Science of Inner Speech

6.3.1 The appeal to Vygotsky

6.3.2 Discriminations of phenomena

6.3.3 Introspection

6.3.4 Bracketing presuppositions

6.3.5 Indirect methods of investigating inner speech

6.3.6 Questionnaires and non-DES experience sampling

6.4 Apprehending in High Fidelity: A Case Study

6.5 Discussion

PART II: Inner Speech, Self-Reflection, and Self-Knowledge

7: Inner Speech, Determinacy, and Thinking Consciously about Thoughts

7.1 Intentional Ascent and Semantic Ascent

7.2 Indeterminacy and Ambiguity in Inner Speech

7.3 The Structure of Inner Speech Episodes

7.4 Thinking Consciously vs. Being Conscious of a Thought

8: Inner Speech and Outer Thought

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Inner Speech as Format

8.3 Inner Speech as Activity

8.4 Thinking as Self-Communication?

8.5 Thinking as Dual

8.6 Type 2 Thinking as Activity

8.7 Speaking as Thinking

8.8 Speaking as Judging and Deciding

8.9 Conclusion

9: When Inner Speech Misleads

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Content without Commitment: Inner Speech as Imagination

9.3 Inner Speech as Speech

9.3.1 Inner speech as productive rather than re-creative

9.3.2 Inner speech acts as the main form of inner speech

9.4 The Experiential Content of Speech Experience

9.5 The Experiential Content of Inner Speech

9.6 The Ways in Which Inner Speech Can (and Can't) Mislead.

9.7 Conclusion

10: Know Thyself: Beliefs vs. Desires in Inner Speech

10.1 Inner Speech and Communication

10.2 The Expression of Beliefs vs. Desires by Assertions

10.3 Inner Speech and Self-Knowledge

10.3.1 Argument

10.3.2 Objections

10.4 Beliefs and Desires

10.5 Conclusion

11: The Self-Reflective Functions of Inner Speech: Thirteen Years Later

11.1 Introduction

11.2 Overview

11.2.1 Self-reflection

11.2.2 Inner speech

11.3 Inner Speech Involvement in Self-Reflection

11.4 Empirical Evidence

11.4.1 Questionnaires

11.4.2 Self-reflection deficits following inner speech loss

11.4.3 LIFG/inner speech involvement in self-referential tasks

11.4.4 Self-reported inner speech about the self

11.4.5 Inner speech and awareness of mind-wandering

11.4.6 The self as narrative

11.5 Theoretical Considerations

11.5.1 Inner speech can reproduce social mechanisms leading to self-reflection

11.5.2 Self-reflection as a problem-solving process

11.5.3 Self-distancing/decoupling

11.5.4 Verbal labelling

11.6 Conclusion

12: Activity, Agency, and Inner Speech Pathology

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Classic Motor Control and Comparator Accounts of Inner Speech Pathology

12.2.1 Classic motor control

12.2.2 The standard comparator account of inner speech pathology

12.2.3 The alternative to the standard comparator account

12.2.4 Support for the standard and alternative comparator accounts of inner speech pathology

12.2.5 Summary of standard and alternative comparator accounts

12.3 Predictive Processing Accounts of Inner Speech Pathology

12.3.1 Overview of Bayesian predictive processing

12.3.2 Enhanced standard approach

12.3.3 Active inference agency approach

12.3.4 Reality monitoring approach.

12.3.5 Summary of predictive processing and active inference approaches to inner speech and verbal imagery pathology

12.4 Conclusions

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

This edition previously issued in print: 2018.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0-19-251676-0

0-19-251675-2

0-19-186686-5

OCLC:

1057677925