Pieces of mind : the proper domain of psychological predicates / Carrie Figdor.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Figdor, Carrie, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Psychology--Philosophy.

Psychology.

Psychology--Language.

Psycholinguistics.

Brain--Psychophysiology.

Brain.

Biology--Philosophy.

Biology.

Biology--Language.

Medical Subjects:

Psycholinguistics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (x, 220 page)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Proper domain of psychological predicates

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

Carrie Figdor presents a critical assessment of how psychological terms are used to describe the non-human biological world. She argues against the anthropocentric attitude which takes human cognition as the standard against which non-human capacities are measured, and offers an alternative basis for naturalistic explanation of the mind.

Contents:

1: Introduction; 1.1 General Remarks; 1.2 Chapter Summaries; 1.3 Consciousness and Content; 2: Cases: Qualitative Analogy; 2.1 General Remarks; 2.2 Background to the Semantic Problem; 2.3 Qualitative Analogy: Plants; 2.4 Qualitative Analogy: Bacteria; 2.5 Concluding Remarks; 3: Cases: Quantitative Analogy; 3.1 General Remarks; 3.2 Models and Meaning: The Lotka-Volterra Model; 3.3 Quantitative Analogy: Fruit Flies and the DD Model.

3.4 Quantitative Analogy: Neurons and the TD Model; 3.5 Concluding Remarks; 4: Literalism: An Initial Defense; 4.1 General Remarks; 4.2 Literalism Elaborated; 4.3 The Implicit Scare Quoter; 4.4 Concluding Remarks; 5: The Nonsense View; 5.1 General Remarks; 5.2 The Nonsense View; 5.3 The Literalist Responds; 5.4 Dennett and Searle Respond; 5.5 Concluding Remarks; 6: The Metaphor View; 6.1 General Remarks; 6.2 The Metaphor View; 6.3 The Literalist Responds: Motivation; 6.4 The Literalist Responds: Meaning; 6.5 Epistemic Metaphor; 6.6 Concluding Remarks; 7: The Technical View; 7.1 General Remarks.

7.2 The First Variant: The Technical-Behaviorist; 7.3 The Literalist Responds to the First Variant; 7.4 The Second Variant: Exsanguinated Properties; 7.5 The Literalist Responds to the Second Variant; 7.6 Concluding Remarks; 8: Literalism and Mechanistic Explanation; 8.1 General Remarks; 8.2 Homuncular Functionalism and Mechanistic Explanation; 8.3 Seeking a Psychological Exception; 8.4 Discharging Discharging; 8.5 Concluding Remarks; 9: Literalism and Moral Status; 9.1 General Remarks; 9.2 Psychological Ascriptions and Moral Status; 9.3 The Short Term: Moral Status and Anthropomorphism.

9.4 The Long Term: Moral Status and Anthropocentrism; 9.5 The Fear of Mechanistic Reduction; 9.6 Concluding Remarks; 10: Concluding Summary; Bibliography; Index.

Notes:

This edition previously issued in print: 2018.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed May 2, 2018).

ISBN:

0-19-253735-0

0-19-184686-4

0-19-253734-2