The irony of Vietnam : the system worked / Leslie H. Gelb ; with Richard K. Betts ; foreword by Fareed Zakaria.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gelb, Leslie H.

Contributor:

Betts, Richard K., 1947-

Bloomsbury (Firm), publisher.

Series:

Brookings Classic Series.

A Brookings Classic Series

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Diplomatic relations.

Vietnam War, 1961-1975.

Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States.

Vietnam.

United States.

United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (436 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Distribution:

New York : Bloomsbury Publishing(US), 2016.

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, [2016]

Language Note:

English

System Details:

data file

Summary:

"If a historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it." - Foreign Affairs When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most students of the war argued that the United States had "stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation," as the New York Times 's Fox Butterfield put it. But the perspective of time and the opening of documentary sources, including the Pentagon Papers, had allowed Gelb and Betts to probe deep into the decisionmaking leading to escalation of military action in Vietnam. The failure of Vietnam could be laid at the door of American foreign policy, they said, but the decisions that led to the failure were made by presidents aware of the risks, clear about their aims, knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their allies, and under no illusion about the outcome. The book offers a picture of a steely resolve in government circles that, while useful in creating consensus, did not allow for alternative perspectives. In the years since its publication, The Irony of Vietnam has come to be considered the seminal work on the Vietnam War.

Contents:

Part I. Decisions: getting into Vietnam

Patterns, dilemmas, and explanations

Recurrent patterns and dilemmas from Roosevelt to Eisenhower

Picking up the torch: the Kennedy Administration

Intervention in force: the Johnson Administration, I

Coming home to roost: the Johnson Administration, II

Part II. The imperative not to lose

National security goals and stakes

Domestic political stakes

The bureaucracy and the inner circle

Part III. Means: the minimum necessary and the maximum feasible

Constraints

Pressures and the president

Part IV. Perceptions: realism, hope, and compromise

Optimism, pessimism, and credibility

The strategy of perseverance

Part V. Conclusions

The lessons of Vietnam.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

ISBN:

0-8157-5140-0

0-8157-2679-1

OCLC:

950906377

Publisher Number:

EB00669942 Recorded Books