The many moral rationalisms / edited by Karen Jones and François Schroeter.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Jones, Karen, editor.

Schroeter, François, editor.

UPSO (University Press Scholarship Online)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Rationalism--Moral and ethical aspects.

Rationalism.

Ethics--Philosophy.

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

polychrome

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.

System Details:

text file

Contents:

Cover; The Many Moral Rationalisms; Copyright; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgments; 1: Introduction; 1. Four Core Rationalist Theses; A. Psychology: Reason is the Source of Moral Judgment; B. Metaphysics: Moral Requirements are Grounded in the Deliverances of Practical Reason; C. Epistemology: Moral Requirements are Knowable A Priori; (A) Constructivism; (B) The conceptual approach; (C) Ethical intuitionism; D. Normative Reasons: Moral Requirements Entail Valid Reasons for Action; E. Recombining after Dividing; 2. The contributions to this volume; References; PART I: Normativity

2: Humanity as an End in Itself1. Internal Reasons and Moral Relativism; 2. The Problem of Obligation; 3. Imperatives and Ends; 4. Kant's Argument; 5. Revising the Kantian argument; Acknowledgments; References; 3: Three Kinds of Moral Rationalism; 1. Background; 2. Epistemology for Moral Rationalists; 3. The Reasons-First View; 4. The Desirability-First View; 5. The Function-First View; 6. Moral Epistemology for Moral Rationalists-Again; Acknowledgements; References; 4: Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding; 1. Reflection and the Concept of a Reason

2. Rationality and Understanding3. Theoretical and Practical Rationality; 4. The Requirements of Understanding; A. Explanatory Reasoning; B. Understanding and Intersubjectivity; 5. Understanding, Rationality, and Reasons; 6. Autonomy and Understanding; Acknowledgments; References; 5: Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Reason; 1. The Problem of Normativity within Reason; 2. Practical Reason and the Thing to Do; 3. Vindicating the Normativity-of-Reason Thesis; A. Deliberative Closure; B. Matters for Advice; C. Appropriate Criticism; D. Implies 'Can'

4. Vindicating the Reasons-Independence ThesisA. Fact-Dependent Reasons; B. Evidence-Dependent Reasons; C. Attitude-Relative Reasons; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; 6: Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason; 1. Personal Ideals; 2. The Basic Ideal of Treating Others with Concern and Respect; 3. Nonaccommodationist Ideals; 4. The Limits of Accommodation; 5. Betraying the Basic Moral Ideal by Lending a Helping Hand; 6. A Nonaccomodationist Moral Ideal; Acknowledgments; References; PART II: Epistemology and Meaning

7: Reasons and Justifiability1. Ideal Accessibility; 2. Anti-individualism: From the Inside Out; 3. Moderate Rationalism; 4. Practical Reasons; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; 8: Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics, and Metasemantics; 1. Moral Rationalism as a Family of Theories; 2. Subjective Rationality First; 3. Subjective vs. Objective?; 4. The Conditional Fallacy, Examples vs. Advice: Rationality as Comparative; 5. Properties and Relations; 6. Externalist Metasemantics, and Moderate Judgement Internalism; 7. Externalist Qualms about the Argument.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Electronic reproduction. Oxford Available via World Wide Web.

Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on August 15, 2018).

Other Format:

Print version: MANY MORAL RATIONALISMS.

ISBN:

9780192517463

0192517465

9780191858291

0191858293

Publisher Number:

40028480805

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.