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Time biases : a theory of rational planning and personal persistence / Meghan Sullivan.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Sullivan, Meghan, author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Practical reason.
- Planning.
- Time.
- Physical Description:
- vii, 196 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Summary:
- Should you care less about your distant future? What about events in your life that have already happened? How should the passage of time affect your planning and assessment of your life? Most of us think it is irrational to ignore the future but harmless to dismiss the past. But this book argues that rationality requires temporal neutrality.
- Contents:
- 1 The Received Wisdom p. 11
- 1.1 The Savings Struggle p. 11
- 1.2 The Received Wisdom p. 12
- 1.3 Discounting and Near Bias p. 13
- 1.4 Temporal Discounting and Risk Tolerance p. 17
- 1.5 Arguments for the Received Wisdom? p. 19
- 2 The Life-Saving Argument p. 20
- 2.1 The Art of Measurement p. 20
- 2.2 The Life-Saving Argument p. 22
- 2.3 Rationality Doesn't Require You to Care? p. 24
- 2.4 Bookstore Buddhism p. 26
- 2.5 Measuring a Whole Life p. 28
- 3 The Arbitrariness Argument p. 34
- 3.1 The Arbitrariness Argument p. 35
- 3.2 Arbitrariness and Bias p. 37
- 3.3 Should We Be Permissive? p. 40
- 3.4 Problems for Non-Arbitrariness? p. 42
- 4 Personal Volatility p. 48
- 4.1 Single-Self and Multiple-Self Models p. 49
- 4.2 Two Routes to Personal Discounting p. 55
- 4.3 A Qualitative Basis for Egoistic Concern? p. 56
- 4.4 The Concern Argument p. 58
- 4.5 Simple Connectedness and Moral Valence p. 59
- 4.6 Egoistic Concern and Bias p. 65
- 4.7 The Persistence Argument p. 68
- 4.8 The Two-Part Case for Future Neutrality p. 73
- 5 Preferences about the Past p. 75
- 5.1 A Negotiating Tip for Accident Victims p. 75
- 5.2 Bias Towards the Future p. 76
- 5.3 Determining Discount Functions for the Past p. 77
- 5.4 Do Subjective Probabilities Matter? p. 82
- 5.5 Preferences and Control p. 83
- 6 The No Regrets Argument p. 87
- 6.1 No Pain, No Gain? p. 87
- 6.2 The Mixed Tradeoff Argument p. 89
- 6.3 Resisting Temptation p. 91
- 6.4 Regrets, Affirmations, and Planning p. 93
- 6.5 The No Regrets Argument p. 96
- 6.6 The Dead Have No Regrets p. 98
- 6.7 The Teen Pregnancy Problem p. 100
- 6.8 Success and Neutrality p. 104
- 7 The Arbitrariness Argument (Again) p. 105
- 7.1 Einstein's Hollow Condolences p. 105
- 7.2 The Arbitrariness Argument (Again) p. 108
- 7.3 The Obvious Asymmetry p. 109
- 7.4 The Asymmetry of Emotion p. 111
- 7.5 The Asymmetry of Attachment p. 112
- 7.6 The Asymmetry of Control p. 114
- 7.7 The Asymmetry of Possibility p. 115
- 7.8 Non-Arbitrariness and Neutrality p. 119
- 8 Understanding Temporal Neutrality p. 120
- 8.1 A Perceptual Model for Past Discounting? p. 121
- 8.2 Self and Other Asymmetries p. 123
- 8.3 Time Biases as Evolved Emotional Heuristics p. 126
- 8.4 Two Mistakes about Temporal Neutrality p. 129
- 8.5 Planning in Neutral p. 131
- 9 Neutrality, Sunk Costs, and Commitment p. 134
- 9.1 The Sunk Cost Puzzle p. 135
- 9.2 Weak Forecasting and Weak Honoring p. 136
- 9.3 Sunk Costs and "Rational Irrationality"? p. 138
- 9.4 Sunk Costs and Rational Non-Reconsideration? p. 141
- 9.5 Temporal Neutrality and Rational Commitment p. 143
- 9.6 Sunk Costs and Structuralism? p. 144
- 9.7 Sunk Costs and Integrity? p. 148
- 9.8 Sticking to Your Plans p. 151
- 10 Neutrality and Life Extension p. 152
- 10.1 The Lazarus Problem p. 152
- 10.2 Afterlives p. 155
- 10.3 Caring about Difference? p. 157
- 10.4 Prioritizing Satisfaction p. 160
- 10.5 Temporal Neutrality and Life Extension p. 162
- 10.6 Caring about Phenomenology? p. 165
- 10.7 Better Retirements, Better Deaths p. 167
- 11 Neutrality and Meaning p. 168
- 11.1 The Ecclesiastes Problem p. 168
- 11.2 Meaning as a Form of Value p. 170
- 11.3 Future Bias about Meaning p. 173
- 11.4 From Future Bias to the Permanence Principle p. 175
- 11.5 From Permanence to Nihilism p. 176
- 11.6 Subjectivism about Meaning? p. 177
- 11.7 Heavenly Optimism? p. 179
- 11.8 Temporal Neutrality about Meaning p. 180
- 11.9 Meaning and Vulnerability p. 183.
- Notes:
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 185-191) and indexes.
- ISBN:
- 0198812841
- 9780198812845
- OCLC:
- 1013819246
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