Seemings and justification : new essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism / edited by Chris Tucker.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Tucker, Chris, 1981-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Attitude (Psychology).

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

Summary:

You believe that there is a paper document (or a computer screen) in front of you because it seems visually that way. I believe that I ate cereal for breakfast because I seem to remember eating it for breakfast. And we believe that torturing for fun is morally wrong and that 2+2=4 because those claims seem intuitively obvious . In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are justifiably based on these seemings—at least assuming there is no relevant counterevidence. These considerations have prompted many to endorse some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism. These views hold that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P provides justification to believe P. The main difference is that dogmatism is restricted to some domain, often perception, and phenomenal conservatism is intended to apply to all seemings. Critics worry that such views are too permissive, in part because of their implications regarding cognitive penetration, and that they run into problems with traditional Bayesianism. Everyone in the debate is aiming for a clearer understanding of what seemings are and why they might have justificatory power. In addition to addressing each of these issues, this volume also addresses a wide range of related topics, including intuitions, the nature of perceptual content, access internalism, and the epistemology of testimony and disagreement.-- Provided by publisher.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Includes index.

ISBN:

9780199367719 (electronic book)

0-19-989950-9